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Executive summary 
The aim of this research was to investigate what the Legal Ombudsman can learn from other 
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) providers. The research was commissioned by the Legal 
Ombudsman to help it review and develop its dispute resolution model and ensure it remains fit-for-
purpose. The research involved a case study design and fieldwork was conducted with ten 
organisations: four in the UK, one in Ireland, two in New Zealand, one in Australia, one in Canada 
and one in the USA. The research highlighted a range of dispute resolution practices and illustrated 
some of the key design choices that ADR providers need to make when designing or reviewing a 
dispute resolution scheme. These fell within four areas: the use of online dispute resolution; the 
early stages of dispute resolution processes; mediation approaches; and the later stages of dispute 
resolution and building influence. 
Online dispute resolution 
There is significant potential for ombudsman schemes to develop in this area.  The case study of 
eBay shows how disputes between buyers and sellers can be resolved by a semi-automated system 
which is able to resolve the vast majority of cases by providing options for settlement and 
encouraging parties to reach a view for themselves. One of the benefits of ODR platforms, such as 
that used by eBay, may be their accessibility and transparency, as well as being able to provide 
trusted information which enables parties to reach their own conclusions. A fascinating area of 
future development involves “crowdsourcing” decisions, where a panel of experienced buyers and 
sellers determine the outcome of a case.  
The early stages of dispute resolution 
While there was a reasonable amount of commonality between the case studies in terms of the 
fundamental activities they undertook at the early stages of their dispute resolution processes, a 
range of practices were identified. The Ontario Ombudsman follows an “issue based” approach, 
which demonstrates the value of ensuring that, however a process is designed, case workers are 
given sufficient freedom to bring about flexible and creative solutions to problems.  The New Zealand 
Banking Ombudsman’s approach incentivises resolution during their facilitation stage and provides 
an interesting example of the way in which a fee system can encourage resolution at the earliest 
stages of the ADR body’s processes. The Furniture Ombudsman provides a good insight into a 
scheme that operates two distinct processes (called conciliation and adjudication), but where the 
caseworker rather than the parties decides on the process to be followed.  Empowering caseworkers 
to control the process may have benefits in ensuring that cases are dealt with proportionately.  
The New Zealand Law Society’s Lawyers Complaint Service’s Early Resolution Service shows how 
resolution can be overseen in order to provide assurances as to its fairness. In this case, a standards 
committee with mixed legal/lay representation is used both to decide which cases are suitable for 
early resolution and to approve the outcomes of early resolution. Not all of the schemes we 
considered in the research had decision making powers.  The UK European Consumer Centre, for 
example, illustrates how effective resolutions can be achieved even in the absence of such powers, 
using persuasion skills and knowledge of the law.  Finally, the Australian Financial Ombudsman 
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Service’s telephone conferences provide a useful example of the way in which a classic ADR 
mechanism (conciliation) can be adapted to an ombudsman context and rolled out for use in a 
reasonably high volume of cases. 
Mediation approaches 
There is ongoing interest within the civil justice system in the potential to incorporate mediation into 
existing dispute resolution processes in order to help manage caseloads effectively and 
proportionately. There appears to be some potential for the use of mediation processes in 
ombudsman schemes and the case studies provide helpful illustrations to show how a mediation 
approach can be adapted to meet different needs. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman’s 
mediation process is a formal, classic mediation process. This involves face to face mediation, with 
the parties and the mediator needing to devote significant time to resolution. The Irish Financial 
Services Ombudsman model is likely to be suited to high value, difficult cases that would otherwise 
slow down processes of adjudication.  
A contrasting example was provided by the Small Claims Mediation Service, demonstrating how a 
high volume mediation service may be set up. Using a bank of telephone mediators, each able to 
deal with up to 25 cases a week, appears to work very successfully in the context of small claims. 
The use of time limited sessions and the relatively low comparative cost to the parties and the ADR 
provider are attractive features of this approach. Particularly impressive were the very high levels of 
party satisfaction with the process (both for those whose cases settled and for those that did not). 
There could well be a place for this kind of telephone mediation approach in ombudsman schemes 
dealing with relatively low value claims.  
The later stages of dispute resolution processes and building influence 
The processes used by ADR schemes when making formal decisions on cases are perhaps better 
known and less contentious than those used at the earlier stages of dispute resolution. One issue 
raised by the case studies relates to whether a scheme employs largely inquisitorial or adversarial 
procedures. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman is an unusual example of an ombudsman 
scheme using adversarial and highly formal processes. The benefits of this approach are the 
transparency of the process and high degree of participation it allows the parties, although this is 
likely to lead to higher costs and prolonged dispute resolution.  In contrast, the Ontario 
Ombudsman’s Special Ombudsman Response Team employs ultra-inquisitorial processes as part of 
its work. Such robust processes of investigation, going wide enough to establish broader patterns, 
issues and problems than investigating a single complaint ever could, may be effective in preventing 
future disputes from arising.  
Whether a dispute resolution process is predominantly adversarial or inquisitorial, one issue is how 
the decision making itself should be organised. The Furniture Ombudsman provides an example of 
the single decision maker model, where a single case worker is responsible for decisions 
(occasionally assisted with the provision of independent expert advice from consultants). Other 
decision making approaches are to use decision making panels. Here, a range of expertise or 
backgrounds can be combined so that the decision makers are able to draw on a range of internal 
resources in reaching their decisions. In the Australian Financial Ombudsman Service’s approach, 
where panels are used, they involve a mix of industry and consumer representatives allowing each 
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party to see very visibly that their interests are represented. Interestingly, in the PhonepayPlus 
system, the tribunal is used to deal with non complaint behaviour but equally used as a deterrent 
and encouragement for parties to take steps to ensure compliance and co-operation with 
PhonePayPlus.   
In terms of building their influence, the case studies reported a range of approaches. The Irish 
Financial Services Ombudsman publishes case information about businesses, so that an incentive 
exists (in terms of negative publicity and, ultimately, possible impact on profits) to resolve and 
handle complaints well without the ombudsman’s intervention. In some contexts, such as voluntary 
jurisdictions, however, the ability to publish case information may not be available. The Furniture 
Ombudsman demonstrates how the use of soft, cooperative power is essential where participation in 
an ADR scheme is voluntary.  Closely linked to the building of influence is whether the ADR body 
should combine regulatory functions, an example of which was provided by PhonepayPlus. While 
models which combine regulation and dispute resolution are contentious, in some sectors this may 
prove effective, especially where there is a proportion of ‘non-compliant’ businesses in an industry. 
Conclusions: a model for ADR design 
As well as highlighting notable approaches to inform the Legal Ombudsman’s review of their current 
model, the case studies suggest a range of design choices that are open to ADR bodies. For 
example, at the early stages of the dispute resolution process an important design choice might 
involve the extent to which caseworkers are constrained by strict procedures or, alternatively, given 
discretion to resolve cases in what they consider the most effective way. Another design choice 
might relate to the use of mediation processes and whether these should be calibrated to allow for 
the resolution of high volume, low value claims or, alternatively, low volume, high value claims. The 
conclusions to the report highlight these and other important design choices and propose a model 
for ADR design which sees design choices as residing along ten different spectra. Each spectrum 
illustrates a decision that designers or reviewers of ADR schemes will need to make.  The ten spectra 
are:  
 Funding (public/ private) 
 Jurisdiction (voluntary/ compulsory) 
 Goals (redress/ prevention) 
 Emphasis (public interest/ party interest) 
 Structure (single stage/ multi-stage) 
 Process (inquisitorial/ adversarial) 
 Decision maker(s) (individual/ panel) 
 Technology (high tech/ low tech) 
 Settlement type (imposed decision/ party agreement) 
 Outcome (binding/ not binding) 
Based on this model for ADR design, the report concludes by offering an ADR design toolkit, which 
aims to provide a practical tool for implementing the learning from this report. The toolkit can be 
found in Annex 4. 
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Introduction 
This introduction explains the aim of the research and provides an overview of the case studies 
covered in the report. It explains how the research addresses current issues facing the Legal 
Ombudsman and the broader world of alternative dispute resolution. 
Aim  
The aim of the research was to examine a range of alternative dispute resolution processes and 
mechanisms, in order to identify interesting examples of practice from which the Legal Ombudsman 
could learn in developing its own model of dispute resolution. This included identifying case studies 
from within the ombudsman sector, as well as looking beyond this to examine practices used in 
other dispute resolution schemes.   
The case studies 
We selected ten case studies for participation in the research. Case selection was purposive and on 
the basis of whether the research team (in consultation with the Legal Ombudsman) considered it 
likely that an organisation would exhibit features from which the Legal Ombudsman could learn.  We 
also aimed to select international as well as UK cases. 
The overall aim of case selection was to illustrate some key approaches to alternative dispute 
resolution and exemplify different ways that redress systems could be designed. Table 1, over the 
page, provides a summary of the case study organisations selected and the reasons for selecting 
them. Annex 1 provides a more detailed description of the research methodology and Annex 3 
provides the factual background for each case study. 
Challenges facing the Legal Ombudsman 
In terms of the Legal Ombudsman’s specific operational context, there are a number of issues that 
have guided the focus of the research. Their latest annual report (Legal Ombudsman 2013) 
highlights the following context-specific issues: 
 Lower than expected demand for the service, with fewer complaints received than expected; 
 A need to focus on the unit cost of dealing with complaints, due in part to the lower than 
expected demand; 
 The expansion of the Legal Ombudsman’s statutory jurisdiction to cover aligned areas such as 
Claims Management Companies (CMCs – these are commercial organisations that pursue and 
manage claims on behalf of consumers); 
 The possible creation of voluntary jurisdiction(s) for the Legal Ombudsman, to allow the 
organisation to consider complaints about other professional services; and 
 Diversification of legal services and closer relationships with other professional services, with 
potential complications in terms of overlap for sectoral regulators and redress bodies. 
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Table 1: case study summary 
 
Organisation Reason selected 
 
Ontario Ombudsman 
 
 
Example of combining early resolution and high profile 
systemic investigation approaches. 
 
 
Irish Financial Services Ombudsman 
 
 
Example of formal mediation being incorporated into an 
adversarial, quasi-legal ADR scheme. 
 
 
New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 
 
 
Example of facilitation and conciliation approaches and 
using case fees to incentivise resolutions. 
. 
 
Small Claims Mediation Service (Her Majesty’s 
Court and Tribunals Service) 
 
 
Example of high volume, court-annexed telephone 
mediation service. 
 
 
Furniture Ombudsman 
 
 
Example of voluntary ADR mechanism, adjudicating on an 
industry code of practice. 
 
 
eBay/PayPal 
 
 
Example of high volume online dispute resolution.  
 
 
UK European Consumer Centre 
 
Example of a consumer conciliation and advocacy approach. 
 
 
PhonepayPlus 
 
 
Example of a scheme focused on regulation, and combining 
conciliation with formal adjudication using panel decisions. 
 
 
New Zealand Law Society’s Lawyers Complaint 
Service’s Early Resolution Service 
 
 
Example of an approach in a legal jurisdiction, focusing on 
early resolution of disputes. 
 
 
Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
 
 
Example of telephone conciliation conferences and panel 
decision making. 
 
 
The Legal Ombudsman’s strategy for 2014-2017 outlines how some of these issues will be 
addressed (Legal Ombudsman 2014). This includes using casework outcomes and working with 
others to help ensure better performance of the marketplace and investing in the skills required to 
resolve a greater proportion of cases informally. In terms of what the organisation is planning to do in 
the period 2014 to 2017, the strategy highlights that the Legal Ombudsman will: 
 Expand its jurisdiction and begin dealing with complaints about CMCs; 
 Respond appropriately to changes in the way professional services are being delivered and in the 
way in which the broader landscape of redress is organised; 
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 Continue to find better ways of doing things to ensure good practice and that appropriate 
standards are set for service providers; and 
 Work with stakeholders to provide a simple and coherent approach to redress. 
The Legal Ombudsman was also included in a recent benchmarking exercise conducted by the Legal 
Services Consumer Panel (Legal Services Consumer Panel 2013).  This report highlighted perceived 
strengths and weaknesses of the Legal Ombudsman when compared to other dispute resolution 
schemes.  The report’s conclusions were that: 
 There was a lower rate than in some other schemes of contacts from consumers converting into 
complaints.  This was due to consumer confusion and consumers arriving ‘at the wrong door’, as 
well as gaps in the Legal Ombudsman’s jurisdiction.  A high level of premature complaints (those 
not initially made to law firms) was seen to indicate low confidence in the handling of complaints 
by firms themselves.  
 The scheme performed well on timeliness compared to similar schemes.  Cases that took longer 
were those which required formal decisions by an ombudsman (which occurred in 39% of cases).  
While there was a focus on trying to resolve a greater proportion of cases informally, this was not 
always what consumers would want. In some cases they would want detailed investigation and a 
formal decision even if it took longer. 
 Perceptions of the fairness of the Legal Ombudsman’s decisions compared well with other 
schemes, particularly given that it upholds a smaller percentage of consumer complaints than 
some others.  Advocacy rates (whether consumers would recommend the scheme to others) are 
lower than for other schemes considered in the benchmarking, which may reflect the lower 
uphold rates.  Feedback from consumers is consistent in highlighting the need to keep 
consumers informed about their complaint and to demonstrate that the complaint has been 
understood. 
 The unit cost of the Legal Ombudsman was higher than other schemes considered in the report.  
This was due to the complexity of the disputes and the fact that the high stakes that could be 
involved meant cases were more likely to go to an ombudsman for decision.  It was noted that a 
high unit cost had implications for the Legal Ombudsman’s ambition to expand its work into 
voluntary jurisdictions. The report noted that reductions in unit cost should not be achieved by 
reducing the work of the Legal Ombudsman in raising standards in the legal services sector. 
The context for the present research, therefore, is one where the Legal Ombudsman is grappling with 
the following key questions: 
 How to reduce unit costs and make itself more attractive to voluntary jurisdictions? 
 How to make greater use of informal dispute resolution processes? 
 How to increase its standard-raising work? 
 How to design its processes in order to respond to and pre-empt developments in 
the legal services sector and within the broader ADR landscape? 
It is beyond the scope of this research to provide answers to all of these questions; however, in 
determining what the Legal Ombudsman can learn from other ADR schemes, we have paid particular 
attention to identifying practices, processes and models that address the questions highlighted here 
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and the challenges facing the organisation.  Annex 2 provides a summary of the Legal Ombudsman’s 
current approach to dispute resolution. 
The broader context 
While predominantly focusing on what the Legal Ombudsman can learn, the research is also timely 
in terms of developments in the ombudsman and ADR landscape.  The following paragraphs provide 
a brief overview of the broader context in which the research sits and of some of the wider, 
fundamental questions which arise from it. 
The ‘ombudsman technique’ (Buck et al 2011) has long been recognised as a flexible form of 
dispute resolution, capable of adapting to different political, cultural and legal systems and proving 
equally capable of covering private and public service jurisdictions. The flexibility of ombudsman 
schemes, and their ability to vary procedural approaches to suit diverse jurisdictions and the 
particular needs of their stakeholders, has been seen as a strength of the institution (Reif 2004).  
The pragmatic, tailored approach of ombudsman schemes has, however, resulted in a multiplicity of 
approaches within the ombudsman world: different schemes use different processes and methods 
to resolve disputes. While such heterogeneity is a core feature of the ‘ombudsman technique’, there 
have been recent calls for a harmonisation of approach and process between ombudsman schemes 
(Shand Smith and Vivian 2014). It is hard to disagree that – while maintaining their traditional 
flexibility – ombudsman schemes will increasingly need to provide citizens and consumers with 
processes that are consistent enough to allow for their expectations to be met when approaching 
any ombudsman. 
Questions of consistency and harmonisation are also brought to the fore by the EU’s Consumer 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Directive (EU 2013), which is currently in the process of being 
implemented by nation states.  The Directive sets out minimum standards for ADR providers and 
calls for the creation of competent authorities to oversee providers. The question of what processes 
ombudsman schemes should be using and which are most effective has, therefore, gone from being 
an essentially internal matter for individual ADR schemes to decide (within the limits of their terms of 
reference) to one which is in the public spotlight.    
Advances in technology also present new opportunities and challenges for dispute resolution. Online 
Dispute Resolution (ODR) is viewed by Katsh and Rifkin (2001) as the ‘fourth party’ as it can 
replicate the role of a neutral third party in dispute resolution (Cortes 2014). Using technology to 
resolve consumer disputes is growing quickly and becoming more sophisticated, with data tracking 
analytics and automated systems meaning transactions are dealt with more rapidly than with more 
traditional methods. Technology can make handling time consuming paperwork more efficient and 
reduce the timescales and staff required to resolve large numbers of similar disputes. 
Academics are increasingly interested in the nature and quality of ombudsman and ADR processes.  
Bondy et al (2014) have recently completed a Nuffield Foundation funded study seeking to 
understand and map the use of ‘informal resolution’ by ombudsman schemes in the UK and Ireland.  
Their early findings suggest that the language used to describe these processes is highly 
inconsistent between schemes.  Creutzfeldt (2013) is investigating ombudsman decision making 
and perceived fairness, seeking to assess how consumers perceive the fairness of various 
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ombudsman schemes in Europe. Others have called for the ‘black box’ of informal resolution to be 
opened to scrutiny and are seeking to develop a more critical approach to ombudsman studies 
(Cathcart 2013). 
The key questions that arise in this context are as follows: 
 What might a perfectly designed ADR scheme look like? 
 What mix of dispute resolution processes might be most effective? 
 If harmonisation between schemes is to occur, what form should it take? 
This report seeks to address these questions and, in doing so, to build on Bondy and Le Sueur’s 
(2012) work on ‘redress design’ in the specific context of ombudsman and ADR schemes.  In a 
previous report (Gill et al 2013) we described the lack of coherence in the UK ombudsman 
landscape and the fact that its development had been ad hoc, piecemeal and uncoordinated. In this 
report, our ambition is to provide an insight into the range of dispute resolution processes and 
methodologies available to ombudsman schemes, and to provide a foundation for thinking about 
what an ideal redress architecture might look like in this area.  
Structure of the report  
The report is in five main sections. Following this introduction, the second section provides an 
overview of the main forms of alternative dispute resolution and considers the issue of redress 
design.  It provides the core conceptual framework for the research.  The third section addresses the 
question of how technology may change the design of ADR systems and looks in detail at Online 
Dispute Resolution.  The fourth section reports the empirical findings of the research and shares the 
key insights provided by the case study organisations.  Finally, section five presents the report’s 
conclusions and introduces a toolkit for ADR design. 
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Design choices for Alternative Dispute Resolution 
This section provides a brief introduction to some of the key processes that exist to resolve disputes: 
from adjudication to the negotiation of settlements. It assesses the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of different approaches and outlines criteria which have been seen as important in 
deciding on the best way to resolve particular disputes.  The section ends by looking at the concept 
of redress design (Bondy and Le Sueur 2012) and asks what an ideal redress architecture might 
look like for an ombudsman scheme. 
A unique world 
Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution (CADR) – a development of ADR which includes private 
sector ombudsman schemes – has recently been described as ‘its own unique world, with its own 
unique architecture’ (Hodges et al 2012, p.200).  CADR is distinguished from other forms of ADR by 
the particular focus of the disputes that it seeks to resolve: those between consumers and 
businesses and which are generally of relatively low value.  A major book on CADR in Europe has 
recently highlighted the great variety of forms which CADR can take (Hodges et al 2012a). 
At the same time, for all the diversity which exists in terms of the overall structure of national CADR 
and ombudsman systems, the fundamental dispute resolution processes of individual schemes can 
be seen to coalesce around the following features: 
 The provision of advice and information to consumers and businesses; and/or 
 Attempts to resolve, conciliate or mediate disputes; and/or 
 The provision of a decision (which may vary in the extent to which it is binding). 
Different CADR schemes will lay different emphases on these elements and not everyone will do all 
of them. However, in broad terms and at the risk of oversimplification, these three features can be 
seen as core process characteristics around which individual CADR schemes vary in emphasis.   
As noted in the introduction, ombudsman schemes are perhaps unique amongst systems of dispute 
resolution in the extent to which they allow for a high degree of procedural flexibility in resolving 
disputes. In the UK, ombudsman schemes have come a long way from their initial creation in the 
public sector, where they focused on the conduct of a limited number of in-depth investigations and 
the production of formal decision reports. Ombudsman schemes have for some time now shifted 
from an emphasis on formal reporting, to an emphasis on resolving disputes by the most appropriate 
means available (Seneviratne 2002) although that may be shifting back to formal reporting in some 
schemes. In a drive to provide more impact for more people, for example, the Parliamentary and 
Health Service Ombudsman investigated 2,199 cases in 2013/14 compared to 384 the previous 
financial year (Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman 2014). 
Nevertheless, in shifting to an approach that emphasises the resolution of complaints, ombudsman 
schemes can be seen to have borrowed inspiration from other forms of ADR –many ombudsman 
schemes will now be drawing on skills and approaches that would be familiar to negotiators, 
conciliators and mediators. This leaves the more traditional approach of the investigator and 
adjudicator as the secondary recourse if resolutions cannot be agreed by other means.  Our recent 
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report – based on interviews with UK ombudsman schemes – suggested that ombudsman schemes 
would need to continue to move towards informal approaches to dispute resolution in order to 
respond to pressures from a changing consumer, business and policy environment (Gill et al 2013). 
So, ombudsman schemes can incorporate a range of dispute resolution techniques and processes; 
from highly formal, adjudicative methods at one end, to highly informal, negotiated methods at the 
other. The rest of the sections provides a brief description of the forms of dispute resolution that may 
be available to ombudsman schemes. 
Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
At the simplest level, and in the ADR context under discussion, there are two ways in which a third 
party to a dispute can resolve the dispute: they can impose/recommend an outcome or they can 
assist the parties in agreeing an outcome between themselves. As we shall see, there are several 
ways in which these approaches manifest themselves, but it is important to remember that 
underlying the multitude of dispute resolution approaches lies a very simple dichotomy between 
resolution of disputes by decision and resolution of disputes by agreement.   
As shown in Figure 1, agreement based approaches include negotiation and mediation, while 
decision based approaches include expert determination, arbitration and adjudication. Some 
approaches fall somewhere in between these two ends of the spectrum. Early neutral evaluation and 
conciliation, for example, involve an evaluative approach which seeks to help parties make their own 
minds up without imposing a formal decision. Other forms of dispute resolution exist, but these have 
been focused on as they illustrate the major approaches to dispute resolution. 
 
 
Figure 1: key forms of alternative dispute resolution 
Table 2, over the page, sets out some of the important characteristics of each key form of dispute 
resolution. 
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Table 2: dispute resolution forms and characteristics 
 
Form of dispute resolution Characteristics 
 
Negotiation 
 
The most common form of dispute resolution, which involves a relatively 
informal process where parties discuss issues amongst themselves with a 
view to resolving them by agreement.  There is no set procedure and 
negotiations can vary from simple exchanges between the parties to 
structured settlement meetings. 
 
Mediation 
 
Involves the use of a neutral third party who facilitates a negotiation to 
resolve a dispute.  Details of the process to be followed are usually set out 
in an agreement to mediate which is agreed to by the parties beforehand.  
Mediations can be face to face or on the telephone and tend to involve 
both separate meetings between the mediator and the parties and joint 
meetings where all are present.   
 
Conciliation 
 
This is generally accepted to involve a neutral third party taking an active 
role in putting forward suggestions for settlement or an opinion on the 
case.  The conciliator might facilitate a negotiation between parties where 
possible on their own terms or suggest a potential resolution if the parties 
cannot agree. This proposal may be in writing. 
 
Early Neutral Evaluation 
 
 
The neutral evaluator provides an opinion at an early stage on the likely 
outcome of a case if it were to be litigated. The evaluator seeks to bring the 
parties together and assist them in finding an agreement by common 
consent. This provides more insight into the strengths and weaknesses of 
the dispute and helps the parties identify areas of agreement and focus the 
issues that remain for resolution. It can provide a ‘reality check’ for the 
parties and lead to more focused and less costly dispute resolution. 
 
Arbitration 
 
Arbitration involves an independent third party (the arbitrator) reaching an 
independent decision on a dispute.  The process of arbitration can vary 
depending on circumstances, but must be agreed in advance in an 
arbitration agreement. Some arbitrations may involve hearings similar to 
those used in a court trial, while others will involve only written 
submissions.  In most cases the arbitrator’s decision is legally binding on 
both sides. The use of arbitration in England and Wales is formally 
regulated by the Arbitration Act 1996. 
 
Adjudication 
 
Adjudication involves an independent third party with specialist knowledge 
(the adjudicator) reaching an independent decision on a dispute.  Although 
similar to arbitration, adjudication processes can be simpler, and usually 
produce decisions that are binding on the company but not on the 
consumer. They can be more flexible and adjustable to meet specific 
commercial or other needs.  
 
Expert determination 
 
 
 
 
This involves the use of an independent expert to resolve a dispute.  There 
are several forms of expert determination: an independent expert can be 
appointed to reach a binding decision; an independent expert can be 
appointed to provide expert advice to an adjudicator who is charged with 
reaching a decision on the dispute; or the parties may each commission 
independent expert reports to provide to the adjudicator. 
 
(Adapted from Blake et al 2013, pp. 11-17 and Office of Fair Trading 2010, pp. 1-2) 
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The relative merits of any form of dispute resolution will depend on a range of factors including the 
specific processes employed, the nature of the dispute and the needs of the parties.  However, there 
are some general advantages and disadvantages to dispute resolution by agreement on the one 
hand and dispute resolution by decision on the other.  Table 3, below, highlights some of the 
perceived advantages and disadvantages of ADR forms whci result in agreements.  Table 4, over the 
page, highlights some of the perceived advantages and disadvantages of ADR forms which result in 
decisions. 
Table 3: advantages and disadvantages of agreement-based ADR 
 Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Negotiation 
 
 Very flexible, conducted by parties 
themselves 
 Cost effective, only limited preparation 
required 
 Parties retain control of outcome 
 
 Success depends on how well case has 
been researched 
 Depends on the skill of the negotiators 
 Can lead to poor outcomes for some 
parties if they are unable to put forward 
the strength of their case 
 Can involve confusion over process due 
to informality of negotiation 
 Can fail if parties have unrealistic 
expectations or entrenched views 
 
 
Mediation 
 
 
 Can help parties see the strengths and 
weakness of their cases more clearly 
 Can help parties overcome adversarial 
and entrenched positions 
 Can make offers and concessions look 
more acceptable 
 Can suggest outcomes even in 
intractable disputes 
 Structure of mediation allows periods 
of review to consider offers and 
positions 
 Good success rates and party 
satisfaction 
 
 
 Depends on the abilities of the mediator 
 Can increase costs if mediation fails 
 Needs skilled mediator to avoid leading 
to unjust outcomes 
 May not work if parties are very 
antagonistic 
 Can be difficult if parties are not 
represented (in the sense that they may 
not know what to expect) or otherwise 
prepared in advance 
 
Conciliation 
 
 Similar to mediation in most respects 
 Usually free 
 Experienced conciliator proposes a 
flexible solution 
 Neutral third party can provide an 
opinion 
 Informal and can be achieved in a 
short time 
 If the parties accept the 
recommendations, they become 
binding 
 
 
 Similar to mediation in most respects 
 Both parties may be asked to explain 
the dispute in writing 
 May not provide evidence that would 
become available with investigation 
 May be concerns about impartiality 
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Table 4: advantages and disadvantages of decision-based ADR  
 Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Arbitration 
 
 
 Parties can select arbitrator with 
appropriate expertise and experience 
 Process is private 
 Aspects of the process can be tailored 
to dispute 
 Process can be very structured and 
formal if parties want it to be 
 Can be simple and cost effective if 
decision is on written submissions only 
 
 
 Will not save costs if a formal, trial like 
process is used 
 Parties have no control over the 
outcome 
 Arbitrators do not have the power of 
judges if a party fails to cooperate  
 Arbitrators need to be carefully selected 
to make sure they have the confidence 
of both parties 
 
Adjudication 
 
 
 Can be carefully adjusted to meet 
commercial needs 
 More flexible and cost effective than 
arbitration 
 
 Not necessarily low cost if experts are in 
dispute 
 Decisions may not be binding, meaning 
that further litigation or arbitration may 
be necessary 
 
 
Expert 
determination 
 
 Can save cost and time if the dispute 
would normally require expert 
witnesses in a litigation 
 Offers flexibility as the terms of the 
expert determination can be agreed in 
advance 
 
 Although it should cost less than 
litigation, it can be costly to appoint an 
expert to determine a dispute 
 The determination is normally binding 
even if flawed (e.g. by a mistake of fact) 
 
(Adapted from Blake et al 2013, pp. 11-17) 
Criteria for choosing a dispute resolution method 
Considering the relative strengths and weaknesses of dispute resolution processes in the abstract is 
not enough, since an essential consideration in choosing a dispute resolution process is to consider 
the type of dispute to be resolved.  Indeed, the notion that different dispute resolution processes will 
be required depending on the particular nature and circumstances of a case is now widely accepted.  
The Woolf reforms of English civil procedure of the mid-1990s suggested that the processes used to 
resolve disputes should be proportionate to the value of the dispute under consideration.  This idea 
was subsequently taken forward by the Department for Constitutional Affairs, whose White Paper on 
redress (subsequently enacted in the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007) first used the 
phrase ‘Proportionate Dispute Resolution’ or PDR.  The White Paper explained the concept of PDR as 
follows: 
‘[Our strategy]… starts… with the real world problems people face. The aim is to develop a range of 
policies and services that, so far as possible, will help people to avoid problems and legal disputes in 
the first place; and where they cannot, provides tailored solutions to resolve the dispute as quickly 
and cost effectively as possible. It can be summed up as ‘Proportionate Dispute Resolution’. 
(Department for Constitutional Affairs 2004, p. 6). 
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PDR, therefore, involves the resolution of disputes in a way that is quick, cheap and tailored to the 
particular dispute. The recent Jackson reforms of civil procedure have further emphasised the need 
for parties in dispute to consider alternatives to traditional litigation, so that since 1 April 2013 
resolving disputes through ADR has needed to be given serious consideration in almost all civil 
claims in England and Wales (Blake et al 2013). 
While the notion of PDR and an approach that sees the justice system as needing to provide a 
‘horses for courses’ menu of options for resolving disputes is accepted, there remains uncertainty 
over what this means in practice.  While it is accepted that different disputes may require different 
resolution processes, it is not always clear how decisions can be made about matching disputes to 
processes nor who should be responsible for making those decisions.  
This was one of the questions which the Administrative Justice and Tribunal Council’s (AJTC’s) report 
on developing a strategic approach to administrative justice sought to grapple with: how should the 
system of redress be designed to ensure that it efficiently married up the varied disputes that 
citizens might wish to raise with the most appropriate resolution mechanism to address that dispute 
(AJTC 2012).  The AJTC put it as follows: 
‘The key question in the search for a more proportionate dispute resolution system is “which 
techniques, or types of scheme, are suitable for which type of case?” More colloquially, “which 
horses for which courses?”’ (AJTC 2012, p. 33). 
In order to answer this question, the AJTC suggested a range of ‘mapping factors’ which could help to 
inform decisions about the most appropriate redress options available.  The overall factors 
suggested in deciding which mechanism to use were as follows: 
 capacity of the parties to participate effectively; 
 whether and how the parties are represented; 
 context of the case, including the history of past disputes; 
 any identified need for urgency; 
 nature, importance and complexity of the issues in dispute; 
 the likelihood of an agreed outcome; and 
 cost to the parties and to the taxpayer. (AJTC 2012, p.36) 
As well as providing these general factors, the AJTC highlighted a number of issues that would tend 
to argue towards a specific form of dispute resolution.  An adapted version of these factors is shown 
in table 5, over the page. 
 
 
 
 
 
20 
 
Table 5: mapping factors in selecting a dispute resolution process 
Process Factors favouring process 
 
Traditional hearing 
 
 Involves fundamental legal rights 
 Allegations of fraud/disputes over issues of fact or where reliability of 
testimony requires to be tested 
 Cases where the presence of the parties is essential 
 Cases where there are allegations and counter allegations about conduct 
 
Adjudication without hearing 
 
 
 Where a dispute involves service failure or maladministration 
 The dispute is about the quantum of a financial claim 
 Dispute about entitlement to a financial claim 
 Findings of fact can be made by written and telephone enquiries 
 The dispute does not affect the livelihood or reputation of the parties and 
is objectively of low priority 
 
Mediation 
 
 
 There is an ongoing relationship between the parties 
 An apology, concession or explanation could help resolution 
 Flexible options need to be explored 
 The matter is complex and lengthy 
 Involves more than two parties 
 Process needs to be confidential 
 
(Adapted from AJTC 2012, p.36) 
The literature on ADR suggests a range of further criteria that may be necessary to consider when 
deciding what kind of dispute resolution process will be most suitable to any given dispute.  Table 6, 
below, provides a summary. 
Table 6: criteria for the selection of an ADR option 
Criteria Comments 
 
Cost 
 
In low value cases, there will be a need to keep costs 
proportionate to the dispute.  Negotiation and mediation can be 
cost effective in that context.  In higher value cases, negotiation, 
mediation or expert determination might be cost effective, 
depending on the dispute. 
 
 
Speed 
 
If quick resolution is important, a non-adjudicative option such as 
negotiation or mediation might be effective.  In appropriate cases 
adjudication or expert determination can also be conducted fairly 
quickly. 
 
 
Party control 
 
 
Parties may want control over both the process and outcome of 
their dispute.  In non-adjudicative ADR they have control over the 
outcome, as this requires an agreement to be reached.  In 
adjudicative ADR, while the outcome is beyond the control of the 
parties, they can retain varying degrees of control over the 
process. 
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Objectives 
 
 
Different objectives can be best achieved in a range of ways. If 
the objective is financial, any form of ADR can be used.  However, 
if the objective is non-financial in whole or in part, methods such 
as mediation may be more helpful because of the degree of 
discussion between the parties. 
 
 
Ongoing relationship 
 
 
If an ongoing relationship exists, such as a family or commercial 
relationship, a non-adjudicative option is likely to produce the 
most successful outcome as terms can be fully discussed and 
agreed. 
 
 
Need for expertise 
 
 
If expert opinion is important then expert determination may be 
considered.  Using expert evidence in litigation is almost inevitably 
more expensive and time consuming. 
 
 
Need for neutral assistance 
 
 
If parties become focused on ‘winning’ their case they may find it 
difficult to compromise.  In such cases adjudicative processes 
may be the only option, although an effective mediator may be 
able to help parties assess the strengths and weaknesses of a 
case more objectively. 
 
 
(Adapted from Blake et al 2012, pp. 20-22) 
Designing redress for ADR schemes 
It will be clear that there are a number of ways of resolving disputes, each with their own advantages 
and disadvantages, and each with different factors arguing for them depending on a wide range of 
circumstances. As noted above, ombudsman schemes generally have considerable flexibility to 
shape their processes in ways that will allow them to resolve disputes in the most appropriate 
fashion.   
Ombudsman schemes are able, therefore, to provide parties to a dispute with a range of options as 
part of their dispute resolution processes; this can include information giving, conciliation, formal 
mediation, use of experts, adjudicative approaches and, in some cases, use of formal hearings.  The 
exact processes used and overall shape of the ADR scheme will be determined by issues such as the 
nature of the dispute and the regulatory or statutory context in which the scheme operates. 
Hodges et al (2012) in their study of Consumer ADR in Europe proposed three different models to 
show the ways schemes they studied tended to organise their dispute resolution processes. The first 
shows how a scheme can integrate a range of techniques for dispute resolution into its overall 
structure, initially through direct negotiation between the parties, then by some kind of attempt to 
conciliate by the ADR scheme and finally with the provision of a final decision. Figure 2 below shows 
this model. 
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Figure 2: Integrated use of techniques by ADR providers (Hodges et al 2012, p. 406) 
The next model is an elaboration of the model proposed in figure 2 and involves a more 
sophisticated and complex structure of dispute resolution. This model demonstrates the kind of 
internal processes and safeguards that ombudsman schemes can devise to work towards 
consistency and quality of decision making. 
 
 
Figure 3: More sophisticated model for escalated techniques (Hodges et al 2012, p.406) 
A final model proposed by Hodges et al describes the kind of process often used by trade 
associations operating a conciliation service for their members and their customers. This involves a 
referral being made to the trade association, which will try to reach a settlement between the parties. 
Decision 
Conciliation 
Complaint to ADR scheme 
Direct complaint 
Ombudsman decision 
Provisional ombudsman decision  
Referral from manager to ombudsman 
Indication of draft decision by manager 
Conciliation 
Complaint 
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If this fails, then reference can be made to a third party ADR scheme to take a final binding decision. 
The model is shown in figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Escalation model with an outsourced decision function (Hodges et al 2012, p.406) 
As Hodges et al point out, a key goal of providing different techniques and stages of dispute 
resolution is to try to ensure that disputes that can be resolved quickly and easily are resolved at as 
early a stage as possible.  Proportionality is a key aim of this kind of triage mechanism. 
In terms of the overall design of a redress system, Bondy and LeSueur (2012) have proposed 
(amongst others) two more abstract models for explaining how the internal processes of a dispute 
resolution mechanism might be set up: the filtering model and the resolution model. The filtering 
model explains how redress schemes may aim to ration access to their more robust, detailed and 
costly processes by filtering out those disputes which are not suitable.  Common reasons for cases to 
be filtered out include a lack of jurisdiction, the fact that a dispute has not been made first to the 
body complained about and, finally, because disputes are thought to lack merit based on an initial 
assessment of a case. The filtering model can also involve an element of signposting, where 
members of the public are guided towards a more appropriate mechanism. The filtering model is 
shown in figure 5 below: 
 
Reference to ADR scheme 
for decision 
Conciliation 
Complaint to ADR third 
party  
Direct complaint 
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Figure 5: the filtering model (source: Bondy and Le Sueur 2012, p.11) 
Most, if not all, ombudsman schemes will conform to the filtering model and Bondy and Le Sueur 
note that filtering is a major part of the work of all external grievance handlers.  The second model 
described by Bondy and Le Sueur is the ‘resolution model’, with resolution being a relatively novel 
concept in the world of administrative justice if not in consumer oriented ombudsman schemes.  The 
overriding purpose of this model is to try to resolve disputes at the earliest opportunity.  Bondy and 
Le Sueur suggest that, for established redress mechanisms, this model involves the introduction of 
facilitative dispute resolution approaches to bypass the need for a full investigation, a formal 
decision or a hearing.  Examples of the kind of approaches that might be introduced include 
negotiation, early neutral evaluation, mediation and local settlements.  Figure 6 provides a visual 
representation of this model. 
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Figure 6: the resolution model (Based on: Bondy and Le Sueur 2012) 
We propose a further model that may be introduced to build on Bondy and Le Sueur’s work: the 
prevention model.  In this model, the actual processes of dispute resolution exist not only as ends in 
themselves but for the purpose of providing dispute resolution schemes with the material and 
expertise with which to perform a preventative role in the resolution of disputes. Figure 7 shows this 
model. 
 
 
 
Figure 7: the prevention model 
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The prevention model fits with the vision of dispute resolution set forth by the AJTC when they 
described a ‘strategic approach to administrative justice’ (AJTC 2012, p.1).  It has two focuses: on 
consumer empowerment and education, and on helping organisations to improve. By providing 
advice and guidance and by helping consumers to understand issues with service delivery, 
ombudsman schemes can help consumers understand the strength of their cases. They can also be 
helped to complain to organisations effectively, in ways that maximise the chances of successful 
outcomes.   
At the same time, dispute resolution schemes can assist organisations to improve the services they 
provide and the way in which they handle disputes.  This can involve relatively informal feedback and 
advice or the publication of more formal advice and guidance.  In Scotland, the prevention model 
has been taken to the next level by providing the Scottish Public Services Ombudsman with quasi-
regulatory powers in relation to public services complaint handling (Gill 2014). The prevention model 
attempts to capture the ‘added value’ that ombudsman schemes, in particular, are often said to be 
well placed to deliver in addition to a basic dispute resolution service. 
It will be clear that the models discussed above provide a simplified and partial account of how 
dispute resolution schemes might be organised.  However, they are helpful in providing an analytical 
structure within which issues of redress design can be considered and provide the context within 
which the case studies discussed later in this report may be understood. 
Summary 
Ombudsman schemes inhabit the unique world of Consumer ADR, a key feature of which is 
significant variety and flexibility in terms of structure and process. In addition to investigation and 
reporting, a range of alternative dispute resolution approaches and processes are available to them 
in order to resolve disputes.   
Each approach has particular advantages and disadvantages, as well as certain criteria which argue 
in favour of them being used to resolve a particular type of dispute. There are also a number of 
models which can be identified to help explain the role that various forms of ADR process might have 
to play within the design of a traditional ombudsman scheme. Ultimately, the key questions this 
section has addressed are: what options are available in the design of a dispute resolution scheme 
and how might choices be made to ensure such a scheme is appropriately designed? We will return 
to these questions in the concluding section, where a model will be proposed to clarify the design 
choices available to ADR providers. 
A key area where there is scope for further consideration relates to the impact of technology on 
dispute processes. In a world that is increasingly moving online, how might dispute resolution adapt 
in order to keep pace with change but also exploit the potential of technology to speed up 
procedures, improve access to information and even assist the process of decision making? The 
next section considers these questions. 
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ADR design in an online world 
Introduction 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is the use of information and communications technology to help 
disputants find resolutions to their disputes and is emerging as an increasingly important approach 
for resolving consumer complaints. Initially designed to resolve high volume and low cost consumer 
e-commerce disputes, ODR has developed to enable its use for complaints about financial services, 
property tax and complaints to Ombudsman organisations, such as the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). According to Fowlie (2011), the inaugural ICANN 
Ombudsman, ODR is a process that can be used to improve or supplement most ADR techniques. It 
applies both to online disputes and to real world complaints and can be technology-based or 
technology-assisted. In technology-based ODR, parties are helped through, for example, blind-bidding 
systems to arrive at an optimal outcome. Technology-assisted ODR uses tools to increase the 
efficiency of human-based approaches such as investigation, questioning, presenting options and 
communicating findings and may be particularly attractive to ombudsman and ADR organisations. 
This section gives an analysis of the key issues associated with ODR and assesses its potential, 
drawing from a case study looking at eBay’s system of dispute resolution.  
Definition of ODR 
ODR refers to the settlement of disputes in an electronic environment using information technology. 
It is defined as a mechanism for resolving disputes facilitated through the use of electronic 
communications and other information and communication technology (Philippe 2014).  According 
to Kolar (2014) this is a new way to resolve disputes, giving those with a need for ADR different 
opportunities and processes on which to draw. Flexible scheduling, asynchronous communication, 
privacy and real-time dialogue may make this attractive for modern, tech-savvy consumers. Kolar 
also identifies anonymity as a useful feature of ODR, acknowledging that face to face confrontation 
can be stressful and intimidating, whereas resolving a complaint online eliminates that concern.  
 
Types of service which may be offered in an ODR system include: 
 
 Automated and assisted negotiation; 
 Online mediation (may be text based or involve virtual meetings); 
 Online arbitration (may be text based or involve virtual hearings); 
 Online ombudsman schemes (essentially ombudsman schemes that operate using on online 
platform for the exchange of information between all parties); and 
 Problem diagnosis, pre-negotiation solution wizards, and online filing/ case management. 
ODR platforms 
 
An ODR platform is a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing, exchanging or otherwise 
processing electronic communications – it is also a case management system, in addition to a 
communications platform (Philippe 2014). When designing an effective ODR tool, the core case 
management functions should be automated, including registration, acknowledgement, notifying the 
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ADR organisation, reminders for deadlines and recording of outcomes. A well designed ODR platform 
emphasises the transparency of the dispute resolution process which may give parties a sense of 
fairness which in turn may increase trust in the system. ODR systems can be designed to settle the 
majority of complaints without the intervention of independent third parties. In automated systems: 
 
 Most disputes are resolved at the first stage after parties have exchanged all of the relevant 
information; and 
 A small proportion will then progress to the next stage, such as an ombudsman or other form of 
adjudicator (Cortes 2014). 
 
Rabinovich-Einy and Katsh (2012) provide some guidance for organisations on the verge of creating 
an ODR platform.  They are advised to be clear on:  
 
(1) The role of the dispute systems designer; 
(2) The goals and incentives of the organisation in setting up the dispute resolution system; 
(3) The needs and interests of the stakeholders; and  
(4) The nature, characteristics and suitability of different dispute resolution processes and tools.  
 
The profile of ODR and the use of online dispute resolution platforms is about to expand significantly 
in light of the EU’s ODR regulation.  This will involve the creation of a new ODR platform for disputes 
that arise from online transactions (Hodges et al 2012). It will provide an interactive website with a 
single point of entry for consumers who seek to resolve disputes out-of-court. The platform will link 
all the national alternative dispute resolution entities and will operate in all EU languages. This 
platform will direct consumers to the relevant ADR provider and is expected to be operational in 
January 2016.  
 
ODR example: blind-bidding negotiation 
 
In blind-bidding negotiation, confidential offers are made by both parties and are only disclosed 
when they match certain standards (normally between 5% and 30%) or a specific amount of money. 
The dispute is settled at the mid-point of the two offers (Cortes et al 2012). Rabinovish-Einy and 
Katsh’s study view these innovations as having cut out a laborious process using technology. An 
early example of this type of ODR was developed by Cybersettle.  Cybersettle provided a consumer 
settlement and payment platform enabling high transaction volumes in a secure cloud computing 
environment. They used this approach in complex areas of healthcare to recover payments and in 
insurance to increase productivity in claims management. Cybersettle suggest this reduces backlogs 
of complaints, reduces settlement costs and improves negotiation productivity (Cybersettle 2014). 
SmartSettle are a Canadian organisation that also use game theory to assist the mediator in 
identifying the true needs of the parties and encouraging trade-offs (Ross 2014). In commenting on 
a draft of this report, one of the experts we spoke with noted that this kind of blind bidding approach 
had fallen out of favour and that the industry was looking at more nuanced approaches to dispute 
resolution. 
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The advantages of ODR 
 
Table 7 below highlights some of the possible advantages in using ODR to resolve disputes. 
 
Possible advantages of Online Dispute Resolution 
Enhances consumer confidence 
 
Solutions and resolution are prioritised over blame 
 
Costs are lower and technology adds value 
 
Aids communication 
 
Easy for parties to track progress 
 
Consumers may prefer no face to face contact, consistent with their transaction 
 
Consumers may be empowered through anonymity 
 
More flexibility – people want to complain when it is convenient 
 
Helps reduce jurisdiction barriers, particularly useful for cross-border commerce 
 
Works well for straightforward money disputes about products and services 
 
More consistent outcomes for investigators – guides thinking  
 
Exit satisfaction surveys can be used to scale customer views 
 
Encourages learning from data 
 
Pre-designed text helps complainants to frame their complaints - avoids free text 
 
Speedy response means complainants are less likely to post adverse reviews 
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The disadvantages of ODR 
 
Table 8 below highlights some of the possible disadvantages in using ODR to resolve disputes. 
 
Possible disadvantages of Online Dispute Resolution 
ODR systems can appear impersonal  
 
May prove inaccessible for some due to variances of computer ownership along with knowledge of, ability to 
use, and connection speeds of, the internet 
 
Does not work as well for more complex disputes 
 
The dispute resolution may be limited to money back as is the case with eBay 
 
Disputants are unable to vent their emotions (but may do so in online fora) 
 
Meaningful empathy can be lost in print 
 
Consumer ignorance of ODR 
 
Mistrust of ODR providers 
 
Issues of confidentiality  
 
 
The suitability of ODR approaches 
 
ODR is likely to be most suitable in the following situations where disputes are: 
 
 Occurring between internet users; 
 Of low value; 
 High volume; 
 Cross-border; and 
 From the younger generation. 
 
(Cortes 2014, Hodges et al 2011, Kolar 2014). 
 
An example of an area where ODR is particular suitable and effective is eBay’s dispute resolution 
processes.  This is highlighted over the page in the first of the report’s ‘case study insights’. 
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 Case study insight: ODR in practice  
 
 
eBay is an online auction site which provides a marketplace for the selling and buying of goods.  It 
operates an online dispute resolution system for resolving disputes between buyers and sellers. 
Effective dispute resolution is essential to maintain consumer confidence and ensure that both 
parties in the transaction feel adequately protected. 
The process of dispute resolution begins by eBay asking the buyer to diagnose the specifics of their 
complaint, and to suggest their preferred solution. Buyers and sellers are encouraged to 
communicate directly through its messaging platform – this is an ODR platform that allows for the 
exchange of information between the parties. 
If the dispute cannot be resolved, it is escalated to the Resolution Services team within Customer 
Support for a decision. There is also a money back guarantee – recovery is limited to the purchase 
price for the buyer, and full reimbursement for the seller. The money involved in the dispute is frozen 
by PayPal, ensuring enforcement of the final decision. Over 60 million disputes are resolved every 
year (Hodges et al 2011).  There is no payment of damages (Del Duca et al 2014). 
Eighty per cent of the disputes dealt with through the ODR process are resolved automatically.  Built 
in analytics help to identify any underlying issues which, if addressed effectively, will reduce further 
complaints (Rule 2008). The ODR platform used by eBay employs technology to identify patterns of 
market failure and poor service such as not responding effectively to complaints. 
eBay’s model of dispute resolution places significant emphasis on consumer insight, for example, it 
also has an innovation research lab, which has a focus on gaining insight into consumer issues 
affecting the operation of the online marketplace. This lab uses different methods to research 
consumer satisfaction and usage of systems, by gathering and analysing data. There is also a 
customer forum for sellers and buyers to share experiences and advice between each other. They 
also offer assistance in understanding eBay’s process.  
eBay is innovating in terms of its processes and evolving how it resolves disputes. One innovation is 
the use of crowdsourcing to assist in dispute resolution. This involves inviting experienced sellers 
and regular buyers to join a community court. When a case goes to this court, 100 members of the 
court receive the information and this generates a crowdsourced outcome (Rule 2010).   
Consumers receive very quick  responses for eBay disputes. Research at eBay shows that suppliers 
prefer to lose a case in a small number of days than spend weeks in a complaint that they eventually 
win (Rule 2011). An incentive is to reduce the case fees to reward parties who settle complaints 
early. Further, the opportunity to have adverse feedback removed in exchange for dispute settlement 
within eBay incentivises parties to participate in the process. 
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Some points to note: 
 
 Using an online dispute resolution platform to provide accessible, transparent and 
facilitative dispute resolution 
 
 Providing options for settlement and a list of possible solutions to assist and encourage the 
settlement of disputes 
 
 Maximising the opportunities for the exchange of information and developing shared 
understanding during the negotiation stage 
 
 Providing access to independent third party adjudication where necessary 
 
 Innovating by using crowdsourced outcomes and by building consumer feedback and 
exchange into the process 
 
 
Summary 
 
Following their analysis of ODR, Betancourt and Zlatanska (2013) conclude that, while it might be 
the best option for some complaints, it is not a panacea. Nevertheless, ODR is increasingly being 
used by arbitrators and mediators.  Ombudsman organisations may find ODR an attractive option for 
the future, particularly for their higher volume, lower value cases and for assisting decision makers in 
more complex cases. New ADR schemes or schemes in the process of reviewing their current 
approaches should be giving careful thought to the potential for technology to facilitate and improve 
the way in which certain disputes can be resolved. This report now turns to the case studies and 
provides a description of the data obtained in the course of the research. 
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The case studies: early stages of dispute 
resolution 
The next three sections present the empirical findings of the research and highlight some of the key 
insights gained from the case study organisations. The factual background for each case study 
organisation is provided in Annex 3. In presenting information about each case study, the aim has 
not been to provide a holistic description of each dispute resolution model. Rather, the report 
identifies ‘case insights’, where a particular process, practice or approach seems either to provide a 
good illustration of a certain approach to ADR or appears to provide an interesting and distinctive 
take on dispute resolution. For each ‘case insight’ we have listed some ‘points to note’ which draw 
out some of the key issues that arise from a particular case. 
As noted in previous sections, most ombudsman and ADR schemes attempt to resolve complaints at 
as early a stage as possible. To do this, they employ a range of techniques such as shuttle 
negotiation, facilitated discussion, expectation management and conciliation.  As Hodges et al 
(2012, p.452) comment, most consumer ADR schemes follow a series of simple steps: 
 
a. Consumer contacts trader; 
b. Consumer contacts the Consumer ADR body, or is referred by the trader; 
c. Consumer ADR body tries to conciliate; and/or 
d. Consumer ADR body makes a formal determination on a fair solution. 
 
This section looks at case study examples of approaches used by ADR schemes at an early stage 
and is concerned with step ‘c’ in the sequence above. While conciliation forms an apparently 
straightforward part of the overall process used by ombudsman and ADR schemes, it should be 
noted that there remains uncertainty about what this process looks like. For example, Bondy et al 
(2014) have found a lack of consistency in relation to the terminology used to describe their 
processes at this stage. Some refer to conciliation, some to facilitation and others to informal 
resolution. Our aim here is not to replicate Bondy et al’s work in mapping out and making sense of 
processes used across the board; instead, we provide illustrations of different approaches used to 
informal resolution amongst the case study organisations included in our research. 
 
In terms of the different approaches that can be identified at stage ‘c’ of ADR scheme processes, 
these can be grouped into the following categories: 
 
 Evaluative approach: a caseworker establishes and evaluates the basic facts of a case 
and provides the parties with a provisional view or decision which can be appealed to a 
more senior caseworker. The key feature of this approach is that it is fact based and 
involves an evaluation of the merits of a case. 
 
 Facilitative approach: a caseworker does not evaluate the facts of the case but looks for 
common ground between the parties and opportunities to suggest options for resolving 
a dispute.  If possible solutions are not evident or if proposed solutions are not accepted 
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by the parties, then the caseworker proceeds to a more evaluative approach. The key 
feature of this approach is that it is solution focused and forward looking; it is not 
concerned with the merits of a dispute, only with how a solution could be found to 
overcome it. 
 
 Conciliatory approach: the caseworker brings parties together and gives them the time 
and space to reach an agreement amongst themselves. This approach is similar to 
mediation (see next section), except that the caseworker is able to provide an opinion on 
the merits of the dispute, and to make proactive suggestions about what a reasonable 
outcome would be. The key feature of this approach is that parties are expected to be 
more engaged in finding a solution for themselves, with the caseworker intervening only 
to overcome impasses. 
 
Many of the case studies included in the research demonstrated practices which fell within these 
categories, and this section discusses examples of different ways in which disputes are resolved at 
an early stage.  
 
An important issue when discussing such approaches relates to the extent to which clearly defined 
procedures are desirable and effective when seeking early resolution to disputes. One might argue 
that what is required to resolve cases is the creativity and flexibility to find appropriate solutions to 
what are often very different and unique sets of circumstances. An overly procedural or mechanical 
approach might be seen as limiting and constraining the potential of an ADR body to achieve quick, 
tailored solutions to problems. The Ontario Ombudsman’s Early Resolution Team illustrates this 
issue by laying emphasis on an “issue based” rather than a “process based” approach to the early 
resolution of complaints. The paragraphs below provide a summary of the Ontario Ombudsman’s 
approach. 
 
 Case study insight: an “issue based” approach  
 
The Ontario Ombudsman is one of Canada’s provincial public service ombudsman schemes (the 
factual background to the organisation is in Annex 3). Of the 50 members of staff involved in 
frontline case handling, 27 work in the Early Resolution teams; there are three teams, each with one 
manager and all led by a Head of Early Resolution. In 2013-2014, 72% of complaints were dealt with 
within two weeks, and the Early Resolution teams were responsible for handling the bulk of the 
26,999 complaints received. 
The process followed by the Early Resolution teams is described as ‘shuttle negotiation’ by the 
organisation. An interviewee told us the Early Resolution teams were ‘critical to the organisation’s 
success’ with great emphasis placed on the fact that frontline staff are highly trained and 
knowledgeable. When members of the public call the office, they reach Early Resolution Officers 
immediately (rather than administrative or call handling staff) and have direct access to expert 
advice at the frontline: 
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“When somebody contacts our office they’re not bumped through to different departments… 
It’s one stop shopping with highly qualified individuals… So I think that that’s fairly innovative 
as far as, you know, having these really qualified individuals upfront that do the bulk of the 
work.” (Interviewee) 
A key part of the work of the Early Resolution teams is assessment and triage, with cases being 
screened to determine the most appropriate way to deal with them. Some cases could be dealt with 
very quickly, others would be referred to the investigations team if more complex or to the Special 
Ombudsman Response Team if it was clear they involved systemic issues. Again, investment in high 
quality staff at the frontline was seen as essential to the organisation’s effectiveness in triaging 
cases. 
An important feature of the Early Resolution teams’ work was described by an interviewee as an 
‘issue based’ approach to dispute resolution, which tried to avoid over reliance on process in favour 
of finding creative and appropriate ways to deal with problems.  For example, while there was an 
expectation that cases would be dealt with quickly, the organisation was not driven by managerial 
concerns around timeliness: 
“We don’t really have set timelines or procedures as far as how long cases should take, and I 
think that’s one of the unique features of our organisation is that we’re not process oriented 
as far as, you know, trying to set timelines as to how long a case should take.  The reason 
being is that we’re very issue based and the expectation is that, and a sort of key approach 
to the work is that all cases are dealt with in a timely way, that they’re relevant and that we 
are responsive.” (Interviewee) 
The issue based approach was seen as ‘liberating’ and being important to the ombudsman’s mission 
in ensuring administrative fairness: 
“We’re not process based as are a lot of organisations that we investigate… that’s some of 
the things that the ombudsman speaks out against quite regularly as far as… trying to get 
organisations to get over rules… those are fine, obviously, and there has to be some 
structure but the focus is really on… what is the significance of the issue and what is the 
impact of the issue… it’s not the type of work that is conducive to… rigid rules and 
procedures.  They [case officers] have to think outside the box.  They have to be highly 
analytical and creative in their approach” (Interviewee) 
While flexibility and allowing themselves to be guided by the issues rather than process is a key 
feature of the organisation’s approach, there were nonetheless some common features to how the 
Early Resolution teams went about achieving resolutions. Although described as shuttle negotiation, 
it did not appear that the process involved attempts to get the parties in dispute to agree a 
resolution amongst themselves. Instead, the process of early resolution was fundamentally 
evaluative, with Early Resolution Officers gathering and assessing facts and then pushing for 
resolutions based on their factual understanding of a case: 
“I mean our goal, ultimately, is to resolve complaints efficiently and effectively. So that 
means going to the right… people.  Usually once you’re able to present the facts, once you’ve 
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done your homework, and present them to the right individuals at the right level within a 
particular Government organisation that’s where we can achieve results.” (Interviewee) 
The process of resolution seemed to be less defined by attempts to get the parties to agree amongst 
themselves, therefore, and more concerned with persuading the parties (both the complainant and 
the public body) that the Early Resolution Teams’ assessment of the facts meant a particular 
outcome was required: 
“It’s focused, it’s through the fact gathering, the fact finding, the moral suasion, a lot of it is 
informal enquiries or investigations and escalating enquiries up the chain as necessary and, 
you know, speaking to the people that we need to speak to as opposed to relying on 
protocols or contacts, et cetera.” 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Emphasising creativity and flexibility over procedural rules as the best way to achieve 
satisfactory dispute resolutions 
 
 Empowering highly qualified staff at the ‘front end’ of a dispute resolution process to 
maximise the effectiveness of triage and early resolution and provide a ‘one stop’ 
experience to consumers 
 
 
An interesting contrast to the Ontario Ombudsman’s approach – where acceptance of an early 
resolution is largely predicated on the threat of a formal investigation and the persuasion skills of the 
caseworker – is the approach used by the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman. Here, a sophisticated 
system of case fees helps to provide an incentive for complaints to be resolved at as early a stage as 
possible. While case fees are a feature of a number of private sector ombudsman schemes in the 
UK, the use of a sliding scale of fees provides a useful example of the way in which a fee-model can 
be calibrated to promote the quick and efficient resolution of disputes.  The paragraphs over the 
page summarise the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman’s approach. 
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 Case study insight: incentivised facilitation 
 
The New Zealand Banking Ombudsman is one of four ombudsman schemes dealing with disputes 
about banking in New Zealand. A particularly interesting feature of this scheme was the 
sophisticated system it operated for incentivising the early resolution of disputes. Fees are charged 
annually, calculated on the following basis: 
 25% based on the market share of the financial service provider; 
 75% based on the complaint handling performance of the service provider in the 
previous year – this includes: 
o 8% based on the number of complaints received by the ombudsman that had to 
be referred back to service providers; and 
o 67% based on cases resolved by the ombudsman, classified according to a seven 
point scale depending on how far they had to be escalated. For example, point 1 
on the scale referred to a straightforward closure based on jurisdictional grounds, 
point 2 to a facilitated outcome, while point 5 referred to initial written 
assessments and point 6 to formal decisions and recommendations.   
The effect of this structure was to engender pragmatism and a greater likelihood of early resolution: 
“So they’re incentivised to try and resolve them and what that does lead to is I think a 
greater willingness of the participants to try and find a resolution. To be honest, it drives 
some participants to pay their complainants off. They would rather sustain the extra 500 or 
1000 dollars to make something go away than pay the 6000 or 7000 dollars it might cost to 
go right through to a written assessment. So it does engender some pragmatism.” 
(Interviewee) 
The facilitation process employed by the organisation is similar in some respects to that described in 
the case of the Ontario Ombudsman, particularly in relation to the way it operates as an evaluative 
process: 
“Before you attempt facilitation, you’ll read the whole file and get a feel for what you think 
the outcome would be if it went right through our process, and then it does turn into a little 
bit of a shuttle negotiation so then you share your view as an investigator with both the 
complainant and the participant. So it might be explaining to the complainant that based on 
previous cases we’ve had here and the particular circumstances of your complaint, I can’t 
see that this would be upheld.” (Interviewee) 
The facilitation process was, therefore, an early attempt to persuade the parties that a particular 
outcome was required and to the extent that it involved negotiation, this was a matter of negotiating 
acceptance between the case handler and the party to whom a likely adverse finding was being 
communicated.  
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While the organisation could see a place for more agreement-based procedures being used in their 
dispute resolution scheme, they pointed out that consumers and participating banks came to the 
ombudsman expecting an expert opinion on a case and that, by the time a case came to the 
ombudsman, consumers would be expecting an authoritative view on the merits of a case: 
“I think there may well be room for a more pure mediation approach in ombudsman 
schemes but in my experience a lot of times consumers are looking for guidance and 
expertise when they come to a scheme like ours and so they want to know what the likely 
outcome might be or they want our expertise and experience, and particularly given that it’s 
a relatively informal process. They often haven’t had professional legal advice. They may not 
really have a good sense of what is fair or what is right and so we often fill quite an 
important role in helping to inform customers about what the fair outcome would be 
because we see these sorts of things every day and for them, they may never have dealt with 
an issue like this before.” (Interviewee) 
In common with other financial services ombudsman schemes around the world, the organisation 
included the option for consumers and service providers to reject suggested outcomes during the 
facilitation stage. This was seen as an important safeguard to ensure fairness and is different to the 
model generally used by public service ombudsman schemes: 
“I think the other important thing that we do in our facilitation process is that we always 
make it clear to the parties that they have the option of going through to the formal written 
decision. So the investigator may express their view that a certain outcome would be a fair 
and reasonable one, but the complainant is always informed they don’t have to accept that 
and they can get the ombudsman’s decision so they always know that that option is there.” 
(Interviewee) 
The process of facilitation was very much telephone-based and direct contact with complainants was 
seen as key to ensuring a good understanding of issues and allowing complainants to feel heard. 
Feedback received by the organisation from consumers was that a personal touch was appreciated.  
Interestingly, the organisation also offered a conciliation process as part of its approach to dispute 
resolution, however, this was little used as the facilitation process was found to be a flexible solution 
to most cases. 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Using a sliding scale of fees to ensure that businesses are incentivised to resolve disputes 
at the earlier stages of the process 
 
 Emphasising telephone facilitation as a more effective approach to dispute resolution than 
face to face conciliation 
 
 Ensuring that consumers still have access to a formal decision if facilitation fails  
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A central design feature of the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman scheme (and one which is shared 
by many UK private sector ombudsman schemes) is a two stage process where the initial decision of 
a caseworker can be appealed to a more senior decision maker.1 This is the model broadly described 
by Hodges et al at page 33 above.   
 
While this feature can be seen as a measure to ensure the robustness of decision making and to 
provide a procedural safeguard for the parties, some of the case study organisations used a system 
whereby – although there were two stages to the process – access to the second stage was 
controlled by the caseworker rather than the parties. Progress was not based on whether or not the 
parties accepted an initial decision, but on a caseworker’s assessment of the complexity of the case 
and whether, on the presenting facts and circumstances, it required the use of a more formal 
procedure.  
 
This is the approach used by the Furniture Ombudsman, where caseworkers are in control of the 
process to be followed and where the caseworker’’s decision (whether taken at the conciliation or 
adjudication phase of the process) is essentially final. The granting of discretion and authority to 
caseworkers was seen as a key feature in achieving quick and proportionate resolutions to 
complaints.  This shares some similarity with the Ontario Ombudsman’s “issue based” approach, in 
that frontline caseworkers are trusted and empowered to reach appropriate decisions at an early 
stage of the complaint process. The paragraphs below describe the Furniture Ombudsman’s 
approach. 
 
 Case study insight: empowered caseworkers 
 
The Furniture Ombudsman is a small (9 members of staff), voluntary membership-based dispute 
resolution scheme dealing with complaints from consumers about furniture and home improvement 
services. The Furniture Ombudsman has a conciliation stage and a formal adjudication stage in their 
process. In 2012-2013, 90% of cases were dealt with at the conciliation stage of the process. The 
organisation aims to conclude cases in 90 days, with the conciliation stage aiming to conclude in 30 
days (at present more like 40 to 60 days). At the time of the researcher’s visit to the office one 
ombudsman2 had 180 open cases, with high case loads of around 150 open cases per ombudsman 
being the norm. 
An important design feature of the organisation’s process is that cases are dealt with by the same 
caseworker, whether a case is conciliated or adjudicated.  
“My perception is that if you give a complainant a two stage process and you say ‘this is my 
decision, but if you don't like my decision you can go to somebody else’, if there's no cost 
implication, why wouldn't you go all of the way? I also think that from a staff point of view it's 
                                                          
1
 While the process generally follows a sequential two stage process, case workers can proceed directly to a 
written adjudication report if that appears to be the most appropriate way of dealing with a complaint.  
2
 Caseworkers in the office of the Furniture Ombudsman are now called ‘ombudsmen’. The office includes 2 
ombudsmen, 2 senior ombudsmen and 1 chief ombudsman 
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important that you empower your staff…  and that you say: ‘You have absolute power in this 
case. You're not a cog’.” (Interviewee) 
The approach of having a single caseworker dealing with both the conciliation and adjudication 
process was that it avoided duplicate work, prevented mistakes through handover and allowed the 
case handler to manage expectations more effectively.  Another key feature of the organisation’s 
process is that the decision on whether cases should be settled through conciliation or adjudication 
is entirely up to the caseworker: he or she controls the dispute resolution process.  The parties do 
not have a say in how cases are dealt with and cannot, for example, request a formal adjudication if 
the caseworker does not consider that that would be the best way of dealing with a case. 
“It is totally in the hands of the [caseworker]. Even if a retailer comes and says ‘I would like it 
to go to adjudication’, we would always look to see whether it needs to go to adjudication or 
not.” (Interviewee) 
Effectively, cases will only progress to formal adjudication where a consumer’s case appears 
reasonably strong and there are conflicts in evidence or other important points of contention 
requiring expert independent opinion in order to resolve the dispute: 
“If we think that there's an issue based on our experience or that the consumer has done 
enough to get their case off the ground but the retailer still won't make any offers and stands 
by their report, that's when we might proceed to adjudication. The independent inspections 
are another stage of evidence gathering that allow us to make… a formal decision at that 
point.” (Interviewee) 
The process of conciliation itself shares similarities with those of the New Zealand Banking 
Ombudsman and the Ontario Ombudsman in that it is, generally, an evaluative process where 
caseworkers collect evidence and make a decision on whether a complaint has any merit and, if it 
has, whether any existing offers from the business are reasonable.  Many of the cases could be dealt 
with quite quickly, either by providing independent confirmation to consumers that the business 
acted correctly, or that their offer of redress was reasonable, or by reaching a decision on the facts 
established during the business’ internal complaints process. 
“The first part from the point of view of the [caseworker] is to get the information in. So that 
would be forms from both parties, any inspection reports that have been carried out, and 
any photographs. And from that we can sometimes make a judgement, for example, in cases 
where certain problems are more characteristics than faults. In those cases, it's your job to 
go and explain why there isn't a case and why you're not going to compel the retailer to make 
any offers.” (Interviewee) 
The process can, however, involve an element of negotiation, particularly where cases are not clear 
cut, with businesses being asked whether they wish to make further offers even where a consumer’s 
case is not strong: 
“Sometimes there are things that are less clear cut, for example, there might be a repair 
already being offered and the consumer doesn't want to accept a repair, but would like a 
different remedy. You're always going to go back to the retailer in such a case and say ‘the 
41 
 
consumer doesn’t want to accept that, this is the reason they've given; are there any 
alternative offers you'd be willing to make?’... So from that point of view, even if you look at a 
case and you actually think the consumer's not got a good case, you would probably 
approach a retailer and say ‘I see where you're coming from but in the spirit of conciliation 
we'd quite like to see… are there any offers?’” (Interviewee) 
One interviewee, comparing experiences in other ombudsman schemes, commented that the 
flexibility and authority given to the caseworker was a helpful feature of the organisation’s process.  
This helped to ensure credibility with consumers and meant that cases could be dealt with in the 
most appropriate way. This was seen by the interviewee to compare favourably to other ombudsman 
schemes with internal appeal stages where the initial decision maker had less discretion and 
authority.   
Caseworkers are assisted in the timely resolution of cases and in dealing with high volumes by a 
case management system which could be accessed directly by businesses who were members of the 
scheme.  Documents could be uploaded directly by scheme members and progress could be 
checked. The system also flagged cases which exceeded timescales so that businesses could follow 
these up.  The system was not accessible to consumers; however, consumers received automated 
text messages and emails at various touch points in the process. The system also offered a facility 
whereby short standardised text messages could be sent to consumers to provide quick updates on 
case progress, thus saving the need to write letters and emails. 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Empowering caseworkers to control the dispute resolution process to ensure that cases are 
dealt with in the most appropriate manner 
 
 Reducing the cost of dispute resolution by minimising the number of internal stages in the 
dispute resolution process and controlling access to those stages 
 
 Using quick and semi-automated methods of communication in order to reduce time spent 
providing updates (e.g. providing text messages) 
 
 Providing access to the case management system for businesses through an online 
platform reducing the need to provide updates and simplifies the process of exchanging 
information (although only the business is allowed access at present) 
 
 
A very different approach is exemplified by the New Zealand Law Society’s Lawyers Complaints 
Service, which operates an Early Resolution Service as part of its process for dealing with complaints 
about legal service providers. Here, much greater emphasis is placed on ensuring that strong 
procedural safeguards are in place to manage the early resolution process. Rather than providing 
high levels of discretion and autonomy to caseworkers as in the examples shown above, here 
resolution is overseen by a committee system, which both helps identify cases that are suitable for 
resolution and approves any decisions reached in the course of an early resolution process.  
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 Case study insight: committee oversight of early resolution 
 
 
The New Zealand Law Society is responsible for regulating lawyers who practise law in New 
Zealand. It operates the Lawyers Complaints Service which receives all complaints against 
lawyers and is obliged to investigate all complaints brought before it. The Lawyers Complaint 
Service was established by The Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. This Act and related 
regulations set out the process for investigating complaints against lawyers. The Lawyers’s 
Complaint Service has 24 Standards Committees around New Zealand, with at least one in each of 
the regions covered by a New Zealand Law Society branch.  
 
In November 2011, the New Zealand Law Society’s Lawyers Complaints Service commenced a trial 
of an Early Resolution Service (the NZLS Lawyers Complaint Service ERS) involving complaints from 
four of the main centres. From 1 February 2013, this was extended nationally. All new complaints 
are assessed by an initial triage committee for suitability for early resolution: 
“Each day all complaints received are reviewed and triaged into either a standard track or 
the Early Resolution Service (ERS) track.  Where appropriate, complaints are referred to 
mediation using an external facilitator through the formal standard track complaints 
process. After triage, any complaints allocated to ERS then go to an ERS Standards 
Committee to consider the complaint and whether it should be accepted by ERS” 
And 
“The ERS identifies and deals with complaints using alternative dispute resolution 
techniques.  Complaints within the process are dealt with by staff who are trained in ADR, 
called resolvers, and they undertake telephone facilitation between the parties or explain 
the process and options to both the lawyer and complainant in cases where there has been 
a decision by the Standards Committee that the complaint should not go any further.” 
   
So essentially, each complaint goes through a ‘double triage’: an initial triage where staff determine 
whether the complaint is suitable for early resolution, and a second triage where the Standards 
Committee gives further consideration to its suitability. 
 
At the time of responding, the NZLS Lawyers Complaint Service ERS employed three part time 
resolvers and two full time administrative staff. They described their current stance and approach as 
follows: 
 
“The ERS team presently aims to resolve its complaints within 20 working days.   Progress 
toward that has been achieved but currently complaints within the ERS team are taking an 
average of 30 days to resolve. If a matter is resolved between the parties with the 
assistance of an ERS resolver, that agreement must be approved by the Committee.  This is 
a safety net to ensure that only appropriate complaints are accepted into ERS and also that 
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the agreements reached are acceptable not only to the ERS staff but also to the Standards 
Committee. That committee is made up of practising lawyers and lay persons and provides 
useful guidance to the resolvers both as to the substantive issue and process.” 
 
The kinds of cases or disputes which are most likely to resolve through ERS are: 
 
“Minor costs and consumer disputes. It is also easier to resolve a complaint between a 
lawyer and client than complaints made by third parties against lawyers on the other side.  
Some lawyer v lawyer complaints are able to be resolved. A number of complaints are 
received from prison inmates.  Taking the time to call these complainants and assist with 
contacting their lawyers regarding appeals and the like may result in a resolution.” 
 
Parties to a complaint have control over the process, but not always over the outcome: 
 
“If the parties do not agree to the process or are unable to reach an agreement the 
complaint follows a standard track process. For a resolution of a complaint the outcome 
needs to be agreed and this may result in the complaint being withdrawn.  All agreements 
are subject to full approval by the Standards Committee. Matters involving misconduct, 
requiring a more “disciplinary” approach or which indicate protection of consumers is 
necessary, may be taken further even if the complainant indicates he or she wishes to 
withdraw the complaint.” 
The NZLS Lawyers Complaint Service ERS considers the particular strengths of their ERS model to 
be: 
 
“Standards Committees made up of lawyers and lay persons deciding whether or not to 
accept a complaint for early resolution or NFA [no further action] provides a good safety net 
and provides the resolvers with some teeth.  It also allows the resolvers to adjourn a matter 
if necessary to seek instructions.  Telephoning both parties to advise the reason for taking 
NFA has also assisted parties to understand the process and suggest other options to them.  
Timeliness is crucial. The evaluation of all complaints provides important feedback. 
Evaluations indicate a much higher level of satisfaction with ERS handling of complaints 
than standard track.” 
 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Using a Committee to oversee the early resolution stage and managing to maintain good 
levels of timeliness despite involvement of committee 
 
 Improving levels of satisfaction by making greater use of telephone facilitation techniques  
 
 The faster resolution of complaints through use of the early resolution process 
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The case study examples referred to so far in this section have concerned adjudicative ADR schemes 
which use some form of early resolution as part of their overall process. An example of an 
organisation which does not have the power to adjudicate on disputes and which relies solely on 
attempts to resolve by persuasion is the UK European Consumer Centre (UK-ECC).  
 
In this case, because it is unable to provide a decision on a complaint, the UK-ECC relies to a much 
greater extent on the use of persuasion techniques. In common with the other case studies 
considered so far, the approach is fundamentally evaluative, however, since the UK-ECC needs to 
establish that there is prima facie evidence of a legal breach before getting involved in a complaint. 
The paragraphs below highlight the approach followed by the UK-ECC. 
 
 Case study insight: complaint handling without powers 
 
The UK’s European Consumer Centre (UK-ECC) deals with cross border consumer complaints and is 
a member of a network of 30 consumer centres located across Europe providing advice, information 
and assistance to consumers.  The team of 6.5 staff is funded jointly by the EU and the Department 
of Business, Innovation and Skills and is delivered in the UK by the Trading Standards Institute, the 
body representing the interests of trading standards professionals in the UK.   The UK- ECC is the 
busiest consumer centre in the Network.  In 2013, they dealt with 9840 enquiries, 4394 of which 
were classified as complaints.  
The lack of any adjudicative or enforcement powers means that the UK-ECC has to use other 
methods to persuade the parties to settle their disputes.  Their website refers to this as being 
“mediation” but the Director indicated that what they really meant by this was “informal mediation”, 
not least because each individual European Centre deals with only one of the parties. 
“We might use mediation but I think we would clarify that as informal mediation, especially 
with the ADR and ODR work recently, where actually you were suddenly in an environment 
where people have a firm view of what mediation is”. (Interviewee) 
Complaints will only be considered after the consumer has first complained in writing to the trader 
and if the consumer has a “prima facie legal claim” (Article 3(2) (c) Protocol on Case Handling for the 
European Consumer Centres’ Network (ECC-Net) 01.7.2010). Communications with traders are 
relatively robust in making clear the legal position - if the consumer’s allegations are correct.  Legal 
principle was seen as adding weight to their argument when attempting to facilitate a resolution to 
the complaint, one adviser commenting that the law was often the only pressure they could bring to 
bear.  The link with Trading Standards was also viewed as an important aspect which helped add 
weight when they contacted traders as indicated below, 
“Actually, what we'll do is phone up, say we're phoning from Trading Standards and hope to 
have a chat and sort it out.  And that, at a very simple level, is what we do.  You know, we're 
more informed, we can talk about the law, so we have more authority, if you like, in that 
sense, a bit more authoritative in that sense… I think we would say we would go further than 
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negotiation because we are suggesting that there has been a breach here, on the facts that 
we've been presented with.”  (Interviewee) 
Managing the expectations of what the UK-ECC can do whilst also not unnecessarily putting off 
consumers making contact in the first place was seen as a key issue.   
“We know that we have quite a high resolution rate anecdotally, just by having the right 
approach to the trader, the right contact channels and the right knowledge, etc. etc.   And 
that often works. But you don't want to say… I'm trying not to use this phrase - we've got no 
enforcement powers to put people off actually contacting us.”  (Interviewee) 
The UK-ECC is an example of how a complaint handling organisation operates when they do not have 
any formal powers.  The techniques they are using are similar to other schemes using early 
resolution techniques. The relative success that they have despite not having any powers to 
adjudicate in this area provide a useful way of thinking about whether dispute resolution schemes 
which do not have the same limitations as the UK-ECC are fully maximising those advantages.   
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Providing successful outcomes for consumers using powers of persuasion alone 
 
 Demonstrating credibility and expertise to convince businesses to settle cases 
 
 Demonstrates the need consumers have for advice and information and highlights the 
question of who should fund this role.   In the case of the European Consumer Centres this 
advice role is publicly funded.  ADR schemes may have to fund this via their members.   
 
 
It will be evident that, in the cases discussed so far in the report, evaluative approaches tend to be 
preferred so that, effectively, early resolution refers to a decision taken at an early stage of the 
process rather than an attempt to foster agreement between the parties.  
 
There were, however, some examples of organisations using processes that aimed to encourage 
parties to settle issues amongst themselves, with the caseworker facilitating that process rather 
than imposing a decision as in the evaluative approach. The New Zealand Banking Ombudsman and 
the Australian Financial Ombudsman, for example, both employ a conciliation process as part of 
their schemes.  
 
The New Zealand Banking Ombudsman provides a face-to-face conciliation service, which is used 
infrequently since they find that they are able to resolve the vast majority of their complaints through 
the facilitation process described above. For the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman, there was 
some questioning of the extent to which agreement based approaches were useful in their particular 
context, since they found that consumers were coming to the ombudsman for guidance, expertise 
and a view on the merits of their case. Asking them to go back to reaching an agreement with the 
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party with whom they were in dispute would not, in many cases, be particularly desirable for the 
consumer. It seems, for this reason, the conciliation process is very rarely used. 
 
The Australian Financial Ombudsman operates a telephone conciliation service, which it uses on a 
more frequent basis and which appears to work successfully. The use of the telephone rather than 
reliance on face to face conciliation clearly increases the flexibility of the approach and may have an 
influence on the extent to which it will be appealing to consumers. At the same time, particular 
jurisdictional requirements are likely to explain the greater degree to which the Australian Financial 
Ombudsman uses conciliation: all financial hardship cases must be subject to conciliation, thereby 
ensuring that the process is regularly used. Interestingly, although this approach emphasises the 
seeking of agreement between the parties (with directions by the case worker encouraging rather 
than imposing resolution), it appears that the Australian Financial Ombudsman is moving towards a 
more directive and evaluative system.  
 
 Case study insight: telephone conciliation conferences 
 
The Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) Australia is a dispute resolution service approved by the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).  FOS Australia is making increasing use of 
“conciliation conference” procedures to resolve cases over the telephone. 
Conciliation conferences are compulsory for financial difficulty cases.  However, they can be used in 
any dispute if they are considered suitable and both parties agree and in that case they will also be 
allocated to the conciliation team.  There has been increasing uptake of conciliation in recent years, 
in particular in the area of general insurance which traditionally had made little use of it (FOS 2013).   
If conciliation is not appropriate or the parties do not agree to conciliation the case is allocated 
instead to a “dispute analyst”, who will use more traditional negotiation techniques to attempt an 
early resolution.     
The telephone conciliation service was described as essentially a three way telephone ‘hook up’ 
between the applicant,  the financial services business and the FOS conciliator.  The conciliators 
have all been trained, and have received at least three days of training on mediation in addition to 
their usual adjudicator training.  Despite this, FOS Australia were clear that the service they provided 
was conciliation, not mediation, with the conciliator taking a role in facilitating resolution.  
Satisfaction rates appear very good – 89% of people who went through the process said their 
experience was positive (FOS 2013).  Perceived advantages included the opportunities it gave to 
address the emotional needs of the complainant particularly in financial distress cases where, for 
example, the complainant was facing the loss of their family home, and to facilitate apology without 
admission of legal liability.  According to an interviewee, in approximately 70% of cases the 
conciliation conference resulted in a successful agreement. The funding model for FOS Australia also 
ensures that there are clear financial incentives to the member for resolving the complaint at the 
conciliation or negotiation stage. 
FOS Australia have recently piloted a new Fast Track Procedure for single issue low value banking 
and finance complaints (under 10,000 Australian Dollars) which aims to resolve complaints within 
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60 days.  The fast track procedure includes a truncated version of the existing telephone conciliation 
called telephone “case conferences” (in order to distinguish them from the existing conciliation 
conferences model).  Here, the call with both parties will take a maximum time of one hour.  Since 
these cases should be relatively straightforward, the conciliator will make known their initial view on 
the dispute, seek comments, and attempt to conciliate a mutually acceptable agreement.  If no 
agreement is reached under the new fast track procedure the same case handler will issue a 
decision. This is very different from the existing conciliation conference procedure, which 
emphasises the confidentiality of anything discussed during the conciliation conference, and where if 
the conciliation is unsuccessful the case is referred on for investigation.   
The success of the pilot is currently being evaluated but it is expected that its lessons will be applied 
elsewhere in the organisation and the pilot will be extended.  According to an interviewee, of the 183 
cases dealt with under the fast track pilot, 120 cases were settled at this stage. 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Using three way telephone conferences to bring parties together to discuss and resolve 
complaints 
 
 Using truncated case conferences which are more directive and involve greater input from 
case workers in relation to outcomes 
 
 Ensuring a sense of openness and transparency by talking to both parties at the same time 
(rather than shuttle negotiation) 
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The case studies: mediation 
The definition of mediation used in this report is a process which ‘involves the use of a neutral third 
party who facilitates a negotiation to resolve a dispute’ (Blake et al 2013, pp. 11-17). This definition 
implies that the mediator is both impartial and independent, and that their role is to assist the 
parties in dispute find a solution to their problem.  
On their web site, the Scottish Mediation Network describes mediation as being ‘a voluntary process’ 
and say that it ‘only takes place if both parties agree that they want to find a solution. It is a 
confidential process where the terms of discussion are not disclosed to any party outside the 
mediation hearing’ (Scottish Mediation Network 2014). Mediation itself is a non-binding process. 
However, a mediation agreement can be made binding if there is a signed mediation agreement. 
It is not unusual for ombudsman schemes to say that they use mediation, particularly in the earlier 
stages of their complaint handling processes. However, a closer examination of their methods finds 
that case officers in these schemes are often employing a form of shuttle negotiation, with a view to 
facilitating a settlement of the complaint that is mutually acceptable to both parties. This is a 
legitimate form of dispute resolution, but it is not mediation as defined above and earlier in this 
report. For example, the ombudsman scheme and not the parties is in charge of the process and it is 
often the ombudsman who decides whether mediation will take place.  
Also, in some ombudsman schemes, the case officers cannot be described as being either 
independent or impartial and the mediation is not a confidential process. If the complaint does not 
settle at ‘mediation’, it is often the same case officer who then goes on to propose a resolution or 
decision in relation to the complaint. It is likely that they will do this using the knowledge or 
information they have gained as part of their earlier involvement in the complaint. Very few 
ombudsman schemes, therefore, use mediation in its true sense and, instead, when mediation is 
mentioned it is more likely to be a form of dispute resolution close to that which was described in the 
previous section of this report looking at the early stages of the dispute resolution process. 
There are, however, some instances of mediation being formally used as a distinct dispute resolution 
process within ombudsman schemes. The Scottish Legal Complaints Commission (SLCC) is an 
example of a UK scheme which has mediation as a discrete stage in the complaint handling process. 
Section 8(4) of their founding legislation (the Legal Profession and Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 2007) 
says ‘Where the Commission considers it appropriate to do so, it may, by notice in writing to the 
complainer and the practitioner, offer to mediate in relation to the complaint.’  
The SLCC has a four stage process: Eligibility, Mediation, Investigation and Determination. At the 
Mediation stage, it calls on a panel of external independent mediators and the mediation process is 
administered by a Mediation Co-ordinator. If a complaint does not resolve at mediation, the 
Mediation Coordinator writes to both parties to inform them that a Case Investigator will now be 
allocated to their complaint in order to undertake an investigation. The mediation case file is 
confidential and information relating to the mediation is not passed on to the Case Investigator. 
One of the questions in relation to the use of mediation within ombudsman schemes, is whether this 
is appropriate in principle. This was touched upon in the previous section looking at conciliation 
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where it was pointed out that parties may come to an ombudsman expecting a decision, and may be 
disappointed if they are offered mediation instead. This is particularly so given that disputes 
considered by an ombudsman scheme will already have been considered as part of an 
organisation’s internal complaints procedure. One would expect that cases that could easily resolve 
would do so at that stage, while complaints that reached an ombudsman would be more intractable 
and less amenable to an agreed solution.  
Two case studies researched for this report shed some light on the potential for using mediation in 
ombudsman schemes and the circumstances in which this may be appropriate.  The first is the Small 
Claims Mediation Service for small claims disputes in England and is a good illustration of a high 
volume telephone mediation service. The second is the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman which 
provides an example of low volume, formal mediation. 
 Case study insight: high volume telephone mediation 
 
The Small Claims Mediation Service is run by Her Majesty’s Court and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) and 
provides a court-annexed dispute resolution service for small claims disputes in England and Wales.  
The Service’s main aim is to reduce the pressure of work on the courts by ensuring that cases that 
do not require judicial attention can be resolved more quickly, cheaply and informally.  The Service 
has recently had its administration centralised and it now operates with an administrative staff of 17 
based in Northampton and a complement of 17 mediators based throughout the country.  
When a small claim is submitted, the parties are given information about mediation and asked to 
indicate whether they would be willing to use the Service.  When both parties indicate that they are 
willing, this results in a booking request; about 1,200 booking requests are received a month.  At 
present the Service does not currently have enough resources to accommodate all booking requests 
(35% of booking requests can be accommodated).  Bookings need to be made within 28 days, 
otherwise the case is remitted back to the court. Mediations currently take place on average within 
4.3 weeks of a booking being made.  
A full time mediator normally completes between 20 to 25 mediations a week. Each mediator is 
expected to conclude 550 cases a year.  Whilst mediators aim to settle every case, a settlement rate 
of 62% or more is seen as good performance. Mediators were recruited internally from HMCTS staff 
and were retrained in mediation. In terms of settlement trends, cases that involve two companies 
(rather than two consumers or a consumer and a company) are more likely to settle, as are those 
which involve smaller sums in dispute.  The key driver for settlement was a desire from the parties to 
avoid the time and cost involved in the court process: 
“The main thing from our point of view is the fact that not everyone wants to go to a court 
hearing, they don’t want to spend their time travelling there.  Some of them just want to get 
some resolution and I think this service is the only thing that provides them with it.  Prior to 
the mediation existing, they’d have to go out to that hearing, sit before a district judge etc 
and both parties might have been quite likely to compromise.  So, I think it’s delivering a 
much better service for both parties.” (Interviewee) 
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Interestingly, unlike the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman’s approach to mediation (see below) – 
where cases of higher value were seen as more suitable for mediation and settlement – here the 
lower the value of the case the more likely it was to settle. The process of mediation involved the 
following key steps: 
o Mediator phones defendant to check they are available, explains the process, asks whether 
they are entering mediation in good faith, emphasises that the aim is settlement, says will be 
phoning back and forth between the parties with 5-10 minute gaps. 
o Mediator phones the claimant and explains things exactly as to the defendant. Asks claimant 
to explain claim and then summarises understanding back to the claimant. 
o Mediator phones the defendant, summarises claim as put by the claimant and asks for a 
response to the claim. Summarises response back to the defendant (including highlighting 
any shared ground between the parties and pointing out issues that seem in contention). 
Says will go back to claimant and asks the defendant, in the meantime, to start thinking 
about what would settle claim for them. 
o Mediator then continues to go backwards and forwards, relaying offers, highlighting 
differences in position, common ground, asking parties to consider the strength of their case, 
highlighting best case and worst case scenarios if it went to court, emphasising the benefits 
of settlement, and highlighting the possible disadvantages of a failure to settle. 
o If an agreement is reached a verbal agreement is made and the parties are reminded it is 
binding at that stage. The verbal agreement is followed up by email which sets out the 
agreement reached in writing. 
When the telephone mediation service was first piloted, it was subject to some criticism by 
commentators who questioned whether it truly was a mediation service and questioned its claim to 
effectiveness (Doyle and Reid 2007).  Consumer Focus’ (2010) assessment of the Service was more 
positive calling it “a relative success story”.  In more recent commentary on the Service, mediator 
and academic, Charlie Irvine, noted that the service “clearly works”, commenting that all the key 
aspects of mediation were retained in the telephone mediation model: 
“The 25 minute demonstration displayed the full repertoire of mediator moves, delivered with skill, 
speed and pleasantness. It was like watching a stripped-down, slicked-up commercial mediation 
without the posh accents.” (Irvine 2011) 
From the perspective of consumer satisfaction, the service appears very successful.  Figures 
released in 2012 (HMCTS 2012) for the period 2007 to 2011 show that 94.4% of respondents said 
they would use the Service again (this fell to 85.9% for those whose cases did not settle during the 
mediation). 
An interviewee commented that the fact that the mediations took place over the telephone and were 
quite short did not impede the process of mediation.  Use of the telephone could actually be helpful 
to diffuse conflict and consumers were sometimes glad that they would not have to face or speak 
with the other party.  This interviewee also made clear that in her view the service being provided 
was mediation rather than merely a ‘settlement service’: 
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“You know, there are strict, not strict, but you’ve got those five points [the 5 stages of 
mediation] that you need to cover with that because that is a mediation.  Otherwise, if you’re 
not careful, you’re just a settlement officer just going forward and backwards with offers and 
it’s more than that.   I mean you could easily…  You know, I could ring somebody up and say, 
right, what are you offering here?  All you’re doing is backwards and forwards.  That’s not 
mediation.  That’s just putting forward a settlement.  I know it comes as part of it at the end, 
you know, because we are negotiating then but what we’ve done is gone through that whole 
procedure.” (Interviewee) 
In terms of the administration of the service and the potential for it to be replicated in different 
contexts, there were no particular difficulties in setting up and operating this type of scheme.  The 
key issue was determining whether mediation would be suitable for the particular types of dispute 
being dealt with: 
“So, I think it’s more about, is the actual specific work suitable for mediation, rather than the 
setting up of it.  I think the setting up of it is no concern at all, really” (Interviewee) 
One other issue, highlighted by Irvine (2011) is whether the service is effective only because it deals 
with claims of low value (at the time Irvine was writing the upper limit for small claims was £5000, it 
has since increased to £15,000).  Irvine comments: 
“Of course these are small claims, with a maximum value of £5,000 (about 6,000 Euros). Perhaps 
they are not that complicated. However, monetary value is not the same as importance and these 
are often highly significant conflicts. The fact that so many settle in the time allotted should be a 
serious challenge to the rest of us [mediators].” (Irvine 2011) 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Using short form telephone mediation to achieve settlements of relatively high volumes of 
low value disputes  
 
 Increasing party satisfaction by providing a process that is significantly quicker than the 
alternative (going to court) and providing parties with control of outcomes 
 
 Providing parties with flexibility and convenience by using the telephone and keeping 
sessions to within an hour 
 
 Reaching settlements without the parties having to speak to each other directly, which 
some parties may prefer in cases where conflict has been difficult to manage 
 
 May require a strong incentive (e.g. the threat of court) to achieve results 
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The other example of mediation considered in this report shows a very different approach and is 
much closer to classical notions of mediation. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman conduct their 
mediations face to face and parties are generally advised to allow for a whole day to conduct the 
mediation. As we will note further below, the implications of setting up a mediation process in this 
way is that more significant costs are incurred both for the ADR scheme providing the mediator and 
for the parties in terms of travel and time costs. As a result, mediation was seen as being suitable for 
a quite different type of case in this particular context. 
 Case study insight: low volume, classical mediation 
 
The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman is the statutory body dealing with complaints about 
financial service providers in the Republic of Ireland.  It is empowered to offer mediation as part of 
its dispute resolution service and, following a high court judgement, now offers mediation in all 
cases.  Take up of mediation is, however, very low.  In 2012, out of 8125 complaints received, the 
organisation resolved only 5 cases through mediation.  In general, the organisation carries out about 
15 mediations a year.  The cost of mediations is borne by the ombudsman. Mediations are currently 
carried out by three members of investigation staff who have received formal mediation training. 
Mediations are conducted in person, at the Financial Services Ombudsman’s office in Dublin.  
Parties are advised to be prepared to spend the day in mediation, although cases can frequently be 
resolved more quickly.  In terms of process, the mediation begins with a joint session, explaining how 
mediation works, the role of the mediator and clarifying expectations.  In particular, it is made clear 
that the mediator will not propose a solution but only try to get each party to ‘think outside the box’ in 
coming up with their own solutions. While the parties control the outcome, the mediator remains 
responsible for the process.   
The joint session then involves opening statements, a summary of the issues by the mediator and an 
attempt to identify and resolve any issues that can be resolved immediately.  After the joint session, 
individual sessions are held between the mediator and the parties to discuss the outstanding points 
of contention.  The process can then repeat itself until agreement or deadlock is reached.  In terms 
of the characterisation of this mediation process, an interviewee commented that it was it was a very 
formal approach: 
“I mean, the mediation that we have at the moment, the format envisages the parties being 
here, two separate rooms; usually that involves negotiators on their behalf, you know, 
representatives on their behalf; again, tipping over into the slightly more formal, legalistic 
style, confrontational, adversarial.” (Interviewee) 
Because of the high cost to the parties in terms of time and potentially travel, the kinds of cases that 
tended to be mediated were ones which were higher value or which involved complex issues or grey 
areas: 
“I would think that the class of cases that would be really amenable to mediation, first of all 
we’re probably talking about…you’re talking about the larger more complicated cases. Again 
it would be...it could take a day of someone’s time, so if there’s a dispute over a small 
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amount on someone’s bank charges, well, that’s not a case for mediation, but I think more 
complicated cases, cases where it’s not cut and dried.” (Interviewee) 
In terms of the low take up of mediation, the service provider is usually the one who does not want to 
mediate, and this appears to be because they have satisfied themselves that their position is correct 
during their internal consideration of a complaint and, therefore, they are unwilling to give ground: 
“It takes two parties to mediate and generally speaking the providers don’t want to do it 
because I guess by the time it reaches that stage, the positions have somewhat hardened. 
Unless both parties are willing to mediate, it’s pointless to go to mediation anyway.” 
(Interviewee) 
Nonetheless, mediation was seen as offering parties a number of benefits, such as allowing the 
parties to retain control of their dispute, helping to repair relationships and providing confidentiality 
in relation to the outcome.  The latter could be particularly valuable to the providers, who might 
welcome the opportunity to reach confidential agreements in order to avoid publicity that could have 
a wider impact on business: 
“Sometimes it’s I think from the provider’s perspective is we really don't want this to get out, 
we don't want anyone to know what has happened because it might make us look bad. It’s 
more of an optics thing perhaps really for the provider. Maybe it’s an issue where they say 
okay we want this to be confidential because maybe there’s a potential snowball effect that 
if this gets out there might be... hundreds of these cases and they want to literally put a lid 
on it now, right come in here, settling the case and having a confidential agreement and 
that’s the end of the matter as far as they’re concerned.  That might be one of their 
motivating factors.“ (Interviewee) 
In relation to the success rate of the mediation process, this was reported by an interviewee to be 
around 60%. Generally, if parties agreed to come to mediation, it meant that there was a willingness 
to settle and try to ensure issues got resolved.  As with the decision to participate in the mediation in 
the first place, the approach of the providers tended to be very important in terms of settlement 
since they inevitably were in a more powerful position than the consumer: 
“The outcome will really ultimately be told by the provider because they’re the ones who 
have the cheque book so to speak on the day and they’re the ones who will provide that 
solution.” (Interviewee) 
While the mediation process was not designed to be high volume or to be a core part of the 
organisation’s bulk dispute resolution process, it was nonetheless seen to be beneficial in a small 
number of high value and complex cases:  
“What I constantly say is that mediation will never resolve the bulk of our cases, but it can 
certainly resolve more than ten or fifteen a year.” (Interviewee) 
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Some points to note: 
 
 Whilst not used in high volume this approach to face to face mediation may be successfully 
used to resolve complex, high value and contentious cases depending on the needs of the 
ADR scheme 
 
 Even where used infrequently, mediation may reduce costs in cases whose complexity may 
otherwise lead to protracted investigation and subsequent appeal 
 
 The confidentiality of mediation outcomes may be attractive to businesses in some contexts 
and is a selling point that can be emphasised to help ensure take up of mediation 
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The case studies: later stages of dispute 
resolution and building influence 
Investigation and adjudication have traditionally been seen as the core business of ombudsman 
schemes. As noted above, ideas about using facilitative techniques and other forms of ADR as part 
of ombudsman processes are comparatively recent.  Approaches to adjudication are therefore better 
known and less contentious. There are, however, a number of differing approaches available to ADR 
bodies when deciding how to structure the later stages of their dispute resolution procedures. Often 
these later stages are reserved for more significant casework and the process is partly designed to 
ensure the outcomes of this casework are more robust and influential. The key design issues here 
include: 
 How is the decision making itself structured e.g. is decision making individual (a single 
caseworker) or group based (a panel of decision makers) and is any assistance provided by 
expert advisers?  
 
 To what extent will the case worker operate an inquisitorial or adversarial approach? While 
ombudsman schemes have traditionally been seen as operating an inquisitorial mode of 
dispute resolution, there are likely to be variations in the intensity of investigations, as well 
as in the extent to which the parties are expected to be involved in establishing the merits of 
their cases. 
 
 To what extent are the aims of dispute resolution to generate broader improvements in 
service as opposed to merely settling a dispute? Different schemes will adopt different 
approaches to this issue, although most schemes will combine elements of both. 
The case studies highlighted in this section touch upon some of these design issues and highlight 
different approaches that may be adopted. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman, for instance, 
provides an unusual example of an ombudsman scheme operating a largely adversarial model, 
where both parties are often legally represented and are heavily involved in the process of proving 
their respective cases. This model is heavily influenced by the procedural fairness requirements of 
the Irish courts and, as a result, operates in a manner which is different to many ADR schemes. 
 Case study insight: quasi-legal adjudication 
 
One of the unique features of the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman is the extent to which its work 
is driven by legal considerations as a result of having its decisions being binding on both parties and 
being appealable to the High Court. This has been described as creating a “level of legal formality 
unique in the international ombudsman community” (Irish Financial Services Ombudsman 2013). 
This was commented on further by one interviewee, who explained: 
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“To put it in the international context, a simple way you would imagine to describe the way 
ADR works internationally is on a spectrum of formality versus informality, statutory versus 
voluntary, mediation versus binding dispute resolution. Now on all of those elements, we are 
very formal. I mean, my feeling is that we run the most formal ADR regime in the world; that 
reaches a point when you really can no longer call it ADR, if there’s a certain amount of 
formality.” (Interviewee) 
The right of appeal to the High Court has meant that the organisation has had to adopt procedures 
that are closer to those of the court in order to withstand scrutiny in relation to matters of procedural 
fairness and constitutional rights.  This has been referred to in the literature as a process whereby 
the organisation is ‘judicialised’ and limited in relation to the extent to which it can operate as an 
ADR scheme. Unlike other ombudsman schemes, all cases are dealt with by a formal process of 
adjudication and there is no preceding attempt to conciliate or provide a provisional view: 
“In some regards, given the legal formality that we operate under, I would have a concern as 
to whether or not that would withstand judicial scrutiny. Someone would subsequently say, 
well, I was pressured into doing this by the Ombudsman.” (Interviewee) 
The legal environment was described by an interviewee as the key challenge faced by the 
organisation and 20% of its budget was devoted to legal costs.  At the time of the research, there 
were around 40 ongoing High Court appeals being considered as well as two cases in the Supreme 
Court.   
The consequence of this for the organisation is a high degree of adversarialism as well as a very 
strict emphasis on procedural fairness.  Parties are usually legally represented and the process 
essentially involves the exchange of submissions between the parties until such as a time as they 
have exhausted their arguments back and forth: 
“From the point of view of a complainant it may seem more like arguing a case on affidavit 
before a High Court than it may be an informal ADR service, because they make a 
submission, it goes to the other side, and they get a response and it goes back and forth 
then back and forth and sometimes there are many exchanges before we bring that to an 
end.” (Interviewee) 
While commenting that other ADR schemes were often “aghast” when they heard of the number of 
cases appealed to court and the resulting formality of the scheme, one interviewee pointed out that 
there could be some advantages to a highly formal adjudication taking place.  These could include 
the quality and consistency of decision making, the fairness and transparency of the procedures and 
the degree of participation that the parties had in the course of the case being determined.  One 
interviewee noted: 
“I suppose the very fact that appeals against findings are made, and in some cases it is 
found that the Ombudsman has made an error, I think that in itself justifies…  some form of 
appeal outside of the ADR… some form of appeal is definitely beneficial, I think, to the 
integrity of the overall system” (Interviewee) 
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Another interviewee commented on the fact that an advantage of the organisation’s process was 
that it was demonstrably fair, even if this meant losing some of the advantages of timeliness: 
“I feel that the complainant, who is perhaps suspicious of the larger better resourced 
financial service provider at the outset, can as far as I’m concerned, be sure in the 
knowledge that they are getting all of the evidence that we are getting.  That there is no 
secret adjudication going on where I’m looking through a file quietly over here and I write 
something but there’s no evidence to back that up from the complainant’s point of view.  So 
on balance I think it is a far more transparent and fairer procedure, albeit that that is at a 
cost of it taking a little bit longer” (Interviewee) 
Nonetheless, one interviewee noted that a key lesson that the organisation held for other schemes 
was to ‘be careful what you wish for’ as with formal authority and binding powers came a degree of 
inflexibility that could make fulfilling the role of an ADR mechanism more challenging: 
“Be careful what you want, because if you get a lot more power then suddenly you can find 
that you lose a lot of your informality, which is really critical to sometimes getting things 
done, so be careful what you wish for. That’s the message.” (Interviewee) 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Using adversarial, transparent procedures may have benefits in terms of perceived fairness 
and the participation of the parties 
 
 Formality, while having some benefits, may seriously limit an ADR scheme’s ability to 
provide accessible and speedy justice to consumers 
 
 
In the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman model, there is no need for expertise additional to that 
possessed by adjudicators, who have experience of financial services law. In some contexts, external 
expertise may be required to settle cases, particularly where those cases are complex and issues 
cannot be resolved at an earlier stage. The Furniture Ombudsman is an example of a scheme that 
uses independent experts, which it commissions to assist the process of adjudication for those 
cases that reach the formal adjudication stage. While less formal than the process followed by the 
Irish Financial Services Ombudsman, their approach also involves formal opportunities for comment 
and participation by the parties at this stage. This approach therefore includes an element of “expert 
determination”, as defined earlier in this report, as well as adjudication. 
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 Case study insight: expert advice and adjudication 
 
As noted above, the Furniture Ombudsman employs a conciliation stage in which it determines the 
majority of the complaints it receives based on evidence submitted by and requested from the 
parties. In a small proportion of cases (around 10%) expert independent advice needs to be 
commissioned by an ombudsman in order to resolve matters; where this is the case, the formal 
adjudication process is followed. 
This involves the commissioning of an independent expert from a pool of consultants retained by the 
Furniture Ombudsman.  The expert would normally carry out an inspection of the furniture or 
installation being complained about before preparing a report.  At this stage of the process, there is 
less flexibility than in the conciliation stage and the process is more formal: 
“When we get to the adjudication stage of the process it does slow down because you're 
waiting for people to visit, to write reports, to get the report back to circulate to the parties. 
We then have to weigh up the evidence one last time and write the decision… So that does 
slow the process down.” (Interviewee) 
The process involves the appointment of an expert who has 14 days to inspect and prepare a report.  
The report is then shared with the parties, who are given 14 days to provide their comments. The 
ombudsman then aims to adjudicate based on the expert report and further submissions within 30 
days. 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Commissioning of expert advice is more costly but can assist in providing a trusted third 
party view to assist the process of formal adjudication 
 
 
A radically different approach to dispute resolution is adopted by the Ontario Ombudsman’s Special 
Ombudsman Response Team. Here, the process is ultra-inquisitorial and involves significant 
resources being invested into broad investigations of particular issues, practices or government 
sectors. In this model, the approach is geared towards generating systemic change and maximising 
the influence of the ombudsman on the practices of the bodies under its jurisdiction. Another key 
feature of adopting this process is to facilitate the earlier resolution of other, less serious cases by 
providing a strong incentive for organisations to resolve issues and not be subjected to the public 
glare of a systemic investigation. 
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 Case study insight: “ADR on steroids” 
 
The Ontario Ombudsman has a Special Ombudsman Response Team (SORT) to conduct high profile 
systemic investigations; it has powers both to conduct systemic investigations in response to 
complaints and on its own motion (own motion powers are hardly ever used). Systemic investigations 
are high quality, resource intensive investigations which go significantly beyond the initial complaint 
to collect data on and analyse an issue which affects an important administrative system. They deal 
with complex problems that affect many citizens. 
SORT is staffed by eight investigators and one director.  In 2013-2014, SORT launched three new 
investigations, and has conducted 30 major investigations since 2005. SORT cases often involve the 
review of hundreds of complaints, conducting large numbers of interviews, exhaustive document 
reviews, the collection of expert advice and intensive fieldwork.  An example of the scale of SORT’s 
work can be seen in its current investigation into Hydro One (an energy business) which was 
described in the 2013-2014 Annual Report as involving: 
 Interviews with Hydro One staff, customers, stakeholders and utilities in other jurisdictions; 
 Site inspections at call centres; 
 Obtaining 19,000 pieces of Hydro One documentation; and 
 Meetings with stakeholders. 
SORT looks at the systemic aspects of individual cases but the detail and remedy for individual cases 
is dealt with by the Early Resolution Team.  The process followed by SORT is as follows: 
 Assessment to decide suitability (seriousness of the issues, public interest, likelihood of 
making beneficial recommendations, assessment of pros and cons, how complex and 
difficult to investigate, and other compelling reasons); 
 Planning of any investigation (what resources are required, what evidence will be needed, 
what problems and roadblocks are likely); and 
 Gathering information (All interviews are digitally voice recorded, and paper and digital 
documents collected, and will often look at best practice in other areas to help make 
recommendations). 
SORT investigate cases using a small team of investigators rather than a single individual, in order to 
allow for the greater breadth and depth of investigation required. The timescale for a SORT 
investigation varies according to the case but, as an example, the office set a timescale of nine 
months for the completion of the Hydro One investigation. An important feature of SORT’s approach 
is to involve the media from the start of an investigation right up to the publication of the report to 
ensure that the issues being dealt with gain profile. The organisation also actively uses social media, 
for example, through the ombudsman’s twitter account. The impact and profile of SORT 
60 
 
investigations was described by an interviewee as key in ensuring the public visibility and 
consequent influence of the organisation:  
“If you'd gone out there ten years ago and you'd asked people at random on the street, have 
you ever heard of the Ontario Ombudsman?  I'd be amazed if one in 20 had… I think if you 
did it now, you know, maybe one in three, maybe one in four, because...and they know what 
we do and what we don't do and how we can help and how we can't help. I think that's purely 
because... three or four times a year we get a front page of the newspaper here will sell 
three million copies, and a picture, big picture of [the ombudsman] on the front, you know, 
ombudsman tackles whatever, or scathing report on this, that or the other.  And that has 
huge benefits from a visibility and viability perspective, and actually doing good.” 
(Interviewee) 
The systemic work done by SORT was seen by the interviewee to be a helpful factor in ensuring 
cooperation and compliance in other cases.  The ability of the ombudsman to conduct high profile 
investigations, able to radically upset the status quo, meant that organisations would take the office 
seriously and be more likely to cooperate in resolving small cases.  
“There's a tremendous incentive to get problems resolved on the front line before they come 
to the attention of the SORT team… you know, it's no fun for anybody, being investigated, 
especially at the kind of depth we go to.  And it can be quite disruptive, but that's necessary 
to gather the evidence… People are much more amenable to resolving things knowing that, 
you know, there's potentially a big stick down the road.” (Interviewee) 
While the breadth and scope of such systemic investigations might be seen as overlapping with work 
that might be conducted by auditors in the public sector or regulators in the private sector, an 
interviewee told us that there was little danger of overlap since the ombudsman’s remit was to 
consider administrative fairness and this was not the main concern of other oversight and control 
bodies.  The aim of the SORT team was to “add value” to the ombudsman’s work both in terms of the 
office’s value to ordinary citizens consuming public services, and also in terms of adding value for 
the organisations subject to investigation: 
“Quite often, not always but quite often, the organisation that we investigate will be... not just 
[pay] lip service but be genuinely grateful for us pointing out systemic issues with what 
they're doing.  Because they are then able to go to Cabinet, or to whoever controls the purse 
strings and say, look, you know, [even] if there's resource implications, if there's process 
implications, we need to do this.” (Interviewee) 
The work of SORT was seen by the interviewee as bringing quantifiable benefits in terms of 
improvements to public administration and an interviewee gave an example of an organisation which 
used to be subject to hundreds of complaints a year being subject to only a few following on from a 
systemic investigation. The power of this approach led to an interviewee referring to the model 
employed by the organisation as “ADR on steroids”. 
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Some points to note: 
 
 Using a robust and extensive inquisitorial process, which goes well beyond the individual 
parties to a dispute 
 
 Making proactive use of the media to assist in the process of investigation  
 
 Harnessing the high profile generated through systemic investigations to assist in the 
resolution of cases of lower value/ less significance 
 
 Increasing accessibility, visibility and public confidence in the ADR mechanism by 
publicising changes brought about through systemic cases 
 
 Being able to demonstrate impact and effectiveness to stakeholders 
 
 There are questions over whether such an approach may be unique to public service 
ombudsmen schemes 
 
 
In the examples considered so far, the decision making process is structured around the idea of 
having individual case workers working in an organisational context, taking decisions on cases. In 
some instances the decision maker may reach a decision entirely alone, although in many cases that 
decision may be reviewed or confirmed by a more senior decision maker within the organisation. 
Other ways of setting up decision making for ADR are possible, however, and these may have 
benefits both in terms of encouraging early resolution and in relation to the perceived quality and 
legitimacy of decisions. One particular way of organising decision making is through the use of 
panels.  Examples of this approach from the research included the Australian Financial Ombudsman 
Service, PhonepayPlus and the Geschilllencommissie (the Dutch complaint mechanism). 
 Case study insight: panel based systems 
 
At the Financial Ombudsman Service Australia (FOS Australia), if the early case management stage is 
not successful and the dispute is not resolved disputes are referred to a Case Manager.  The case 
manager will investigate the dispute and make a recommendation.  If either party rejects that 
recommendation then the complaint will be referred to an ombudsman or in some cases a panel for 
a determination. Decision on whether a case should be referred to an ombudsman or to a panel are 
made on consideration of the following issues: 
 Types of disputes; 
  The expertise required; 
  The significance of the dispute; and 
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 Whether any strong preferences are expressed by the parties (although it is ultimately FOS 
Australia’s decision). 
Panels are chaired by an Ombudsman and include a representative from industry alongside a 
representative from a consumer background.   
Panels are used mainly in insurance disputes and are popular with their members as they are seen 
as a way of ensuring industry practice and experience is being taken into account and useful for 
disputes which raise contentious industry wide issues or where difficult questions of fact exist. FOS 
Australia was only formed in 2008 following the merger of five existing schemes to form a single 
dispute resolution scheme covering all financial services.  Panels were used in the predecessor 
schemes for general insurance and investments, life insurance and superannuation and they 
continue to be used in these areas today.  In 2012/2013 of the 1480 general insurance complaints 
referred for determination 573 were decided by a panel (Cameron Ralph Navigator 2014).  In other 
areas there has been a declining use of panels and ombudsman determination is the preferred 
decision making model.   
Panels are also very successfully used to resolve disputes under the Dutch model of consumer ADR 
Geschilllencommissie (Hodges et al 2014). Here, a panel of three is chaired by a legal expert – 
normally a former judge or law professor plus one business and consumer nomination each. This 
ensures that the panel can include both judicial and technical expertise and that the cases of both 
parties can be fully scrutinised.  The hearing is informal, with parties able to attend if they wish.  
There are two locations in Holland where hearings are held.  In the case of travel complaints, the 
consumer was present in 81% of cases, the business 75% (Hodges et al 2014).  Panel decisions 
under the Dutch system are final and neither party can subsequently complain to the courts.    
Hodges et al (2014) describe the Geschilllencommissie as an outstanding success whilst also 
pointing out that it operates within a distinct culture of conflict avoidance and collaboration.  In 
2010, of the 5799 cases processed, 37% were settled and 52% resulted in “binding advice” being 
given by the panel.  The appointment of an expert presents a further opportunity to settle as some of 
these experts are also qualified mediators and a further 289 cases settled at this stage.  The party 
initiating the complaint pays a small fee which varies according to the sector and covers the cost of 
the arbitration as well as any expert report needed.  For any ADR scheme thinking of adopting this 
model there are issues around the cost of panel decisions and the speed with which panel decisions 
can be reached.  Mobile technologies may offer some possibilities for reducing both the carbon 
footprint and the difficulties of scheduling panels.   
PhonepayPlus also uses tribunals to deal with non complaint behaviour and as a deterrent and 
encouragement for parties to take steps to ensure compliance and co-operation with PhonepayPlus.  
Currently PhonepayPlus plans to conduct 23 tribunal hearings per year and provide each tribunal 
with three cases to consider.  However PhonepayPlus is flexible and if there is a need then it could 
add or reduce the numer of tribunal hearings each year and bring in extra resources to deal with it.  
The tribunal also deals with breach of sanction cases (where the business has failed to pay any fine 
or deliver the redress required for example) and also prohibition cases against individuals to be 
banned from the industry.  There is also an emergency procedure for serious breaches requiring 
urgent remedy.  In 2013/2014 they dealt with 63 tribunal cases.  It is a relatively fast process - the 
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average number of weeks that a case will take from allocation to the Tribunal is 16 weeks 
(PhonepayPlus 2014). 
Tribunals consist of three members, the Chair who is legally qualified plus one lay member of the 
Code Compliance Panel and one person from PhonepayPlus’s board members of the Code 
Compliance Panel.  It is the tribunal’s role to determine whether their code has been breached.  The 
procedure is designed to be paper based but there is an opportunity for the business to attend who 
may address the tribunal briefly and many of them do.   
“A case report, including the breach letter and any response from the relevant party will be 
presented to the tribunal. This usually happens a week in advance of the hearing, so that the 
members have time to read the papers before the tribunal meeting. Prior to the case being 
considered by the Tribunal, time will be given to the relevant party to make an informal 
representation to the Tribunal members An informal representation is a chance for the 
relevant party to clarify its response or emphasise important parts of its response  rather 
than present new evidence or arguments in addition to what is already in the papers. 
Providers usually have a half an hour period to provide the informal representations.”  
(Interviewee) 
If a premium rate provider is unhappy with the tribunal outcome they can request a review or an oral 
hearing (PhonepayPlus 2011a) 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Panel system may have benefits in terms of providing assurances to industry around the 
quality of decision making 
 
 Panel decision making may help develop and share knowledge within the organisation 
 
 Formal panels may work well to ensure that individual redress and regulatory objectives are 
achieved  
 
 Formal panels can be used as a sanction to incentivise the earlier resolution of cases 
 
 Panels with mixed composition provide a good way of demonstrating a range of 
perspectives are involved in decision making 
 
We have already seen above that some dispute resolution systems are deliberately calibrated to 
maximise the influence of the ADR body over the organisations they investigate, such as in the 
example of the Ontario Ombudsman’s SORT team. Other approaches to gaining influence were also 
suggested in the case studies.  One of these was the PhonepayPlus model, where the provision of 
redress was integrated in a broader regulatory model.  Research in the social care area has 
suggested that conjoining independent complaint handling with regulatory functions may provide a 
powerful model to ensure both the provision of authoritative dispute resolution and the achievement 
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of systemic change (Simmons et al 2013). This view is not one that is shared necessarily by both 
academics and ombudsmen who have concerns that the role of an ombudsman is not to regulate 
and that there are risks in combining regulation with redress (Legal Services Consumer Panel 2013; 
Seneviratne 2000). 
 Case study insight: integrated regulation and adjudication 
 
PhonepayPlus describes itself as a “modern regulator” (PhonepayPlus 2011b, p3) and combines 
enforcement action with ensuring that individual consumers also receive redress for any harm 
suffered.  It takes a proactive approach to monitoring the market it regulates and works closely with 
industry so that innovation is able to take place whilst also ensuring that a high level of consumer 
protection is maintained.   
“We might find that we receive some complaints , which we believe indicates that there is a 
issue but following an initial investigation we consider it would be better dealt with by 
engaging with the industry members.  It might be that a new service model has evolved, and 
whilst we want to support industry innovation, we must ensure that consumers are 
protected.  In these circumstances, we may invite the relevant industry members to a 
meeting to discuss the services and the issues that have been identified, which provides 
industry members the opportunity to comment and give feedback but also assists us in 
trying to find a solution to the issue.” (Interviewee) 
An interviewee described the model of providing regulation and redress as not fashionable but as 
one that worked in their industry and reported that it had been copied by a number of other 
countries when looking at how to regulate their own markets.  They saw the key benefits of 
combining regulation and redress in the following terms,  
“A organisation that only conducts  complaint resolution and complainant redressmay be 
able to identify an emerging trend in complaints; but by then the problem has already 
occurred and may have been ongoing for some time. While we also identify problems in this 
way, we have the added advantage of being able toproactively identify  problems and stop 
them from happening – which is better for the consumer.” (Interviewee) 
In terms of obtaining redress the relatively low value of most consumers’ complaints means that 
refunding the consumer is often a straightforward decision for the premium rate provider, many of 
whom offer a no quibble refund policy.  Recent research carried out for PhonepayPlus suggested that 
the average complainant had been charged £32.14 by the organisations they are complaining about 
(PhonepayPlus / Jigsaw Research 2014).  In contrast, fines can be up to £250,000.  The maximum 
fine of £250,000 was imposed twice in August 2014. 
There is a strong self-regulatory element to the model which contributes to its success. Most 
complaints are against what is known as “level 2 providers” which are the businesses who control or 
are responsible for the operaration, content or promotion of the premium rate service.  The level 2 
providers will have contracted with a level 1 provider which provides the platform through which the 
premium rate service is accessed.  The level 1 provider is copied into all correspondence with the 
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level 2 provider during an investigation and is expected to carry out due diligence and risk 
assessment on all their level 2 providers to mitigate any risk of wrong doing.  There is, therefore, a 
strong incentive placed on level 1 providers to ensure that their level 2 providers comply with the 
code. 
In addition, PhonepayPlus takes a proactive approach to monitoring the market and do not rely on 
complaints alone.  The research market intelligence team recently spent some time looking at 
affiliate marketing which meant that,  
“When we received the firstc omplaints, the issue was not a new one to us as we had already 
gained some valuable knowledge and experience on the matter from our own investigative 
work.  This can be very useful when working to tight deadlines that ensure cases are dealt 
with expeditiously to prevent further consumer harm. (Interviewee) 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Demonstrates that for some industries regulation combined with redress can work 
effectively particularly where compliance by a small proportion of businesses is an issue 
and/or individual losses small 
 
 PhonepayPlus Tribunal’s  willingness  to impose significant  sanction as well as requiring 
individual redress  
 
 Self-regulatory element as well as the risk of significant sanctions if this does not happen 
appear to help achieve good levels of timeliness when investigating complaints 
 
 
Most ADR schemes are not able to draw upon regulatory powers to affect change where casework 
indicates that this may be warranted and will generally be limited to passing these issues on to a 
relevant sectoral regulator. However, most ombudsman schemes see a core part of their roles as 
involving standard-raising in the industries they oversee and, depending on context, may pursue 
different approaches to achieve this goal. One example is the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman, 
which uses its statutory power to publish casework outcomes to encourage improvements in the 
internal processes of financial service organisations.  
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 Case study insight: “internalising the methodology” 
 
The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman is laying increasing emphasis on helping the service 
providers under its jurisdiction to deal with complaints effectively themselves.  One of the ways in 
which it has begun to do this is by publishing complaint information about service providers (so 
called ‘naming and shaming’), thus providing an incentive for firms to deal with complaints 
effectively themselves in the first instance.  The organisation has also begun to be stricter in relation 
to accepting cases that have not exhausted the internal processes of providers; complaints are now 
routinely referred back so that it is clear to providers that they bear the primary responsibility for 
resolving their customers’ concerns. 
“I think it’s fair to say that we really turned a corner in terms of managing complaints. 
Complaints are way down, largely because of changes that we have implemented. One is 
what other people call the naming and shaming. I mean, we don’t call it that. We say it’s the 
ability to report on the outcomes against individual providers. And then also we’ve been 
much more careful of only taking complaints after the provider has had a full opportunity to 
respond, and we found that we had slipped away from that.” (Interviewee) 
An interviewee described the approach of the organisation as one which sought to ensure that 
service provides “internalised the methodology” of the ombudsman, so that the dispute resolution 
approach used by service providers would be the same and, therefore, prevent the escalation of 
disputes.  
“The job of an ombudsman, it seems to me that there are two jobs and they are very much 
interdependent. One is to decide the cases correctly and the other, and this is the, you hope, 
direct result of deciding the cases correctly, is to influence the behaviour of the 
stakeholders. As I always say, you want them to internalise the methodologies of the office, 
so that they will deal with the complainants the way that you would, they will settle cases 
and then what you hope as well is that maybe they will change their behaviour at an earlier 
stage” (Interviewee) 
The ombudsman had been subject to some parliamentary criticism in recent times over the 
apparently low number of complaints being upheld by the office, although an interviewee pointed out 
that this could be seen as a sign of success in that firms were able to predict, pre-empt and avoid 
adverse findings before it got to that stage. An interviewee commented that this required clear 
explanations to stakeholders so they could interpret the significance of uphold rates correctly: 
“We have received a fair amount of political criticism for not upholding enough complaints. 
Well, gee, what it simply means to me is we have to do a better job of explaining what we do 
and why we do it.” (Interviewee) 
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Some points to note: 
 
 Importance of using case outcomes to help change business behaviour 
 
 Encouraging internal resolution of complaints by businesses, with potential to save on costs 
involved in third party dispute resolution 
 
 
Having statutory powers to publish case information about organisations can be an important part of 
an ADR body’s armoury to tackle systemic issues and raise standards within an industry. ‘Naming 
and shaming’ can effect behaviour and place a spotlight on organisations whose practices are 
inadequate, using the glare of publicity as a sanction and incentive to improve. Not all ADR bodies 
will have such a power, however, and where a scheme’s jurisdiction is voluntary it may need to make 
greater use of alternative strategies to achieve influence over industry practices. An example of a 
voluntary scheme considered in the research is the Furniture Ombudsman, which explained that it 
needs to carefully balance efforts to help industry improve with fulfilling a core consumer protection 
role by encouraging businesses to remain a member of the ADR scheme. This involves having to 
keep costs low and provide a service to businesses that is seen as preferable to the alternative of 
going to court. 
 Case study insight: cooperative influence in a voluntary context  
As a voluntary membership based scheme the Furniture Ombudsman does not rely on statutory 
powers to gain influence over the bodies it investigates.  As a result, it has to work hard to make 
clear to existing and prospective members the benefits of membership.  One of the restrictions on 
voluntary schemes is that the pricing of scheme membership has to be seen as competitive and 
representing good value by businesses. In turn, this means that the potential to conduct ‘added 
value’ work (such as thematic reporting or engaging in significant outreach aimed at raising 
standards) may be diminished. In a voluntary environment, costs that cannot be seen to clearly 
benefit the scheme members who are paying for the service are unlikely to be welcome.  
“We’re one of the lowest [cost ADR schemes]. Our fees I think have moved once since 
1992…. My experience is that retailers are very happy to be a member of a scheme so far as 
it's low cost. If we were to change our case fee to hundreds of pounds, membership would go 
down. There is no retailer that I've ever met that would pay into triple figures for a 
conciliation. It would not be a viable business model for them… So I think that's one thing to 
bare in mind on in terms of the voluntary sector… We would lose the scheme and the door 
would be closed on all of those consumers that have relied on the scheme over the years.” 
(Interviewee) 
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At the same time as needing to focus on providing a low cost external dispute resolution service in 
order to ensure the survival of the scheme, the Furniture Ombudsman is clear that standard raising 
work is part of its role as an ombudsman. It clearly saw its role as going beyond dispute resolution: 
“I don't think we would really be doing our job if we weren't trying to advise the industry how 
they can improve going forward. So I guess, let's take it back to basics: let's say a mediator 
gets involved with a case, they will try to resolve it and then move onto the next one. 
Whereas we're much more equipped and we're much more committed to raising standards 
as well... it's about trying to guide and educate business as well to say this is what went 
wrong in this case, can we give you some feedback. Are we able to help you to repair this 
process going forward?” (Interviewee) 
To achieve standard-raising goals, the Furniture Ombudsman did not rely on publishing complaint 
data and, instead, focused on providing services that would be seen as helpful and adding value to 
the industry. This included the provision of training (again priced at a relatively low cost) and the 
provision of advice to scheme members: 
“The other thing that the retailers like from a voluntary [scheme’s] point of view is the 
training that we do. So not only do they come to us with their dispute issues, they come to us 
to help educate them and improve them and make them better which is great.” (Interviewee) 
This was seen as more appropriate than publishing data, which in the context of a voluntary 
jurisdiction which did not cover a whole industry, could prove misleading and punitive: 
“One of the issues to bare in mind with a voluntary scheme is that you don't want to be seen 
to penalise the businesses that are doing the right thing. Let's say, for example, you have 
five retailers here in the scheme, and you've got five retailers who are not in the scheme. So 
the five retailers outside the scheme are not resolving disputes with consumers and 
consumers’ only route to resolution is by taking them to court. Well, if I publish my data 
about he five retailers inside the scheme, it looks like these five are really bad even though 
they are behaving responsibly by being members of an ADR scheme in the first place… By 
publishing data you'd be distorting what is happening in the industry.” (Interviewee) 
While the voluntary nature of the scheme presented some limits on the kind of work the Furniture 
Ombudsman might do to raise standards, there were some advantages to having a voluntary 
jurisdiction in relation to the attitude of the businesses involved and their willingness to work 
cooperatively with the ombudsman: 
“There's an absolute advantage with the fact that it's voluntary in that retailers are here 
because they want to be here and they trust us and they like us. There's no other reason.” 
(Interviewee) 
While a key feature of the Furniture Ombudsman’s approach to developing influence involved a 
cooperative approach and one which sought to align with the needs of industry, it was also clear that 
the authority of the organisation and its ability to be effective was significantly helped by its close 
relationship with Trading Standards.  
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“I think that we're unique in trading standards. They feel very invested in our service and 
they feel like they're a key stakeholder which is great.” (Interviewee) 
 
 
 
Some points to note: 
 
 Need to adapt methods and practices for raising standards when dealing with a voluntary 
jurisdiction 
 
 Need to make greater use of soft power to keep industry on board, while achieving changes 
that suggest themselves in case work 
 
 The provision of training and advice to industry is a more realistic way of raising standards 
in voluntary jurisdictions than publishing data 
 
 There are advantages to voluntary jurisdictions, such as the increased commitment of 
businesses who have freely chosen to be members of a scheme 
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Conclusions  
Learning from the case studies 
 
The case studies covered in the previous section demonstrate a range of approaches to the business 
of dispute resolution. They illustrate a spectrum of practices which provide insight into how ADR 
schemes can adapt to serve the interests of varied environments. Practices and approaches are 
often very context specific and in presenting insights from the case studies we have been careful not 
to suggest that any approaches represent ‘best’ or even ‘good’ practice. Indeed, the point is that 
what may work very well in one context may work less well in another.  
 
For schemes that are setting up from scratch or, like the Legal Ombudsman, are curious about what 
options may be available to amend their current practices, a number of design choices may help to 
shape the development of dispute resolution practices that will fit a particular context. The case 
studies illustrate and bring to life certain of these design choices and provide suggestions about 
what might work in various contexts. Later in this chapter, these illustrations will be drawn on to form 
the basis of a conceptual model and a practical toolkit for ADR design. 
 
The early stages of dispute resolution 
 
The case studies demonstrate a reasonable amount of common ground in terms of approaches used 
by schemes in the early stages of dispute resolution. By and large, the processes used involved case 
workers making early evaluations of cases and, based on a view of the likely outcome if the cases 
were to progress further, seeking to convince one or both parties that their early evaluation is 
correct. Although broadly similar in approach, several of the cases provided helpful insights into how 
the early stages of dispute resolution might be designed.  
 
The Ontario Ombudsman’s “issue based” approach demonstrates the value of ensuring that, 
however a process is designed, case workers are given sufficient freedom to bring about flexible and 
creative solutions to problems. This suggests that case workers need wide discretion if they are to 
achieve the goals of early resolution. A key feature of this system is that highly qualified staff are 
needed at the “frontline” since the task of finding solutions and persuading parties is a challenging 
and multi-faceted one. There may be broader learning here for ADR schemes who operate a multi-
stage process, where the temptation might be to reserve more highly qualified staff for the more 
complex casework dealt with at the later stages of a dispute resolution process.  
 
One approach which many private sector ADR schemes will already be familiar with is the idea of 
incentivising the resolution of cases through charging fees. Indeed, case fees are part of the systems 
used by many private sector ADR schemes in the UK. The New Zealand Banking Ombudsman’s 
approach to incentivising resolution during their facilitation stage provides an interesting example of 
the way in which a fee system can not only incentivise businesses to resolve cases prior to them 
reaching an ADR body but also go further by incentivising resolution at the earliest stages of the ADR 
body’s processes. Using a sliding scale of fees, an ADR body may be able to exert greater pressure 
on businesses to settle cases as soon as possible, particularly where the disputes are of lower value. 
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Such a system seems likely to provide a powerful addition to the ‘moral suasion’ techniques that 
ADR schemes might traditionally use to settle cases early. The New Zealand Banking Ombudsman’s 
scheme also provides a helpful illustration of how a such a system might be organised in practice. 
 
A key question that arises in the design of dispute resolution processes relates to how many stages 
there should be, what the purpose of each stage is and who controls access to each step of the 
process. The Furniture Ombudsman provides a good example of a scheme that operates two distinct 
processes (called conciliation and adjudication), but where the caseworker rather than the parties 
decides on the process. This contrasts with the example of the New Zealand Banking Ombudsman, 
which provides consumers and businesses with the right to ask for a formal decision where they are 
dissatisfied with an outcome suggested as part of the facilitation process. Empowering caseworkers 
to control the process was seen by the Furniture Ombudsman to have benefits in ensuring that cases 
were dealt with proportionately and at the right stage. Clearly, reducing the number of stages in a 
process and providing case workers with control over access to those stages can result in more cost 
effective dispute resolution. The key question here, depending very much on the context for which 
the ADR mechanism is being designed, is what procedural safeguards are required to meet the 
needs of the types of cases being considered. High value disputes are more likely to require internal 
review stages. 
 
In a previous report (Gill et al 2013) we noted that there were some concerns about the fairness of 
practices at the early resolution stage and we questioned whether early resolution approaches would 
be seen as demonstrably fair by consumers (and, indeed, businesses). While we noted above the 
potential benefits of flexibility and creativity in achieving successful resolutions, the NZLS Lawyers 
Complaints Service ERS provides an example of the way in which early resolution can be overseen in 
order to provide assurances as to its fairness. In this case, using a standards committee with mixed 
legal/lay representation to both decide which cases are suitable for early resolution and to approve 
the outcomes of early resolution shows an interesting approach. We will note again below that the 
use of decision making panels may have some advantages in terms of perceived fairness and 
acceptance of decisions; it may be that the use of some kind of committee may help to provide 
similar assurances in relation to the outcomes of early resolution. 
 
Not all of the schemes we considered in the research had decision making powers.  The UK 
European Consumer Centre suggested that effective resolutions could be achieved even in the 
absence of such powers. Using persuasion skills alone and their knowledge of the law, this case 
study provided an insight into how effective resolutions might be achieved. The insight from this case 
was, perhaps, that ADR schemes – which do have adjudicative powers – could be making more use 
of persuasion tactics early on in their dispute resolution processes. 
 
The final example represents a quite different approach and provides one of the few examples in the 
research of an approach which sought to bring parties together in order to reach their own 
agreement on settling the dispute. The Australian Financial Ombudsman Service’s conciliation 
conferences provide a useful example of the way in which a classic ADR mechanism (conciliation) 
can be adapted to an ombudsman context and rolled out for use in a reasonably high volume of 
cases. With the right cases and in the right context, the benefits of this kind of approach include the 
transparency and openness of the process, the control that the parties have in shaping their own 
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outcomes and the ability of case workers to provide some direction and steer where there is a risk of 
deadlock. It is notable that the Australian Financial Ombudsman Service is currently experimenting 
with a more truncated and directive form of telephone conference and this may also be worth testing 
in other contexts.  
 
Mediation 
 
The case studies highlighting mediation practices provide helpful illustrations to show how a process 
can be adapted to meet different needs. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman’s mediation 
process is a formal, classic mediation process. This involves face to face mediation and the parties 
and the mediator needing to devote significant time to resolution. Costs are also involved in terms of 
travel, with mediations held at the ombudsman’s office. Set up in this way, it is clear that mediation 
is unlikely to be a viable way to resolve the large number of disputes handled by most ombudsman 
schemes. This does not mean, however, that using such an approach to mediation cannot be useful. 
The key question here is what type of case would be appropriate for an ADR body which wishes to 
use mediation. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman model is likely to be suited to high value, 
complex cases that may be very expensive for adjudication. Such a process could be successfully 
calibrated to deal with a low volume of difficult cases that would otherwise slow down processes of 
adjudication.  
 
A contrasting example was provided by the Small Claims Mediation Service, demonstrating how a 
high volume mediation service may be set up. Using a bank of telephone mediators, each able to 
deal with up to 25 cases a week, works very successfully in the context of small claims. The use of 
time limited sessions and the relatively low comparative cost to the parties and the ADR provider are 
attractive features of this approach. Particularly impressive are the very high levels of party 
satisfaction with the process (both for those whose cases settled and for those that did not). It may 
be that the threat of going to court provides a strong incentive both for settlement and in relation to 
the positive perception of mediation. However, there could well be a place for this kind of telephone 
mediation approach in ombudsman schemes dealing with relatively low value claims.  
 
The later stages of dispute resolution and building influence 
 
The processes used by ADR schemes when making formal decisions on cases are perhaps better 
known and less contentious than those used at the earlier stages of dispute resolution. At the earlier 
stages, questions remain unanswered about the suitability of agreement based ADR, as well as how 
to balance the efficiency and fairness of dispute resolution. While less contentious, the later stages 
of an ADR scheme’s dispute resolution process are also open to a number of design choices. One 
issue raised by the case studies relates to whether a scheme employed largely inquisitorial or 
adversarial procedures. Ombudsman schemes have traditionally been seen as inquisitorial bodies, 
although other ADR schemes, such as adjudication schemes, may employ more adversarial 
approaches. The Irish Financial Services Ombudsman is an unusual example of an ombudsman 
scheme using adversarial and highly formal processes. The benefits of this approach are the 
transparency of the process and high degree of participation it allows the parties. This may help to 
avoid a perception that may exist in inquisitorial systems that the investigator conducts her/his work 
behind closed doors and that fact finding may be selective. On the other hand, keeping to rigorous 
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standards of procedural fairness and allowing the parties to control the dispute resolution process, 
may lead to higher costs and prolonged dispute resolution. Given the traditional access to justice 
goals of ADR such approaches may be unsuitable elsewhere, albeit they raise interesting questions 
about the balance between fairness and accessibility that schemes need to be able to strike. 
 
A counterpoint was provided by the example of the Ontario Ombudsman’s Special Ombudsman 
Response Team, which employs ultra-inquisitorial processes as part of its work. Here the parties to a 
dispute are merely the impetus for a process of investigation which is wide ranging in its scope and 
depth. While such an investigative approach goes well beyond dispute resolution (and will be seen by 
some as encroaching on areas such as regulation) it nonetheless fits with the ‘preventative’ dispute 
resolution model we proposed earlier (see page 25). Such robust processes of investigation, going 
wide enough to establish broader patterns, issues and problems may be effective in preventing 
future disputes from arising. The Ontario Ombudsman certainly believes that its systemic work leads 
to very direct benefits in terms of reducing future complaints and changing organisational 
approaches. While such beliefs have yet to be systematically evaluated, this case provides an 
interesting illustration of a dispute resolution model which seeks to be very proactive. One question 
here is whether such a model would be possible in different political and social cultures. There is 
also a particular question around whether private sector ombudsman schemes, who generally are 
closely linked to sectoral regulators, would be able to take on a role with such potential to upset the 
status quo. In our view, there is a strong argument for ombudsman schemes in both the public and 
private sectors having such broad powers if they are used in the unique field in which the 
ombudsman is an expert: preventing consumer detriment and ensuring administrative fairness. The 
provision of such a role may also enable ombudsman schemes to redress the potential for 
‘regulatory capture’ and to look holistically at industries (including pathologies that may arise from 
regulation itself). 
 
Whether a dispute resolution process is predominantly adversarial or inquisitorial, one issue is how 
the decision making itself should be organised. The Furniture Ombudsman, for example, provides a 
classic example of the single decision maker model. A single case worker is responsible for 
decisions, occasionally assisted with the provision of independent expert advice from consultants. 
Expertise is drawn on, not by inviting an expert to reach a joint decision with the case worker, but by 
expertise being furnished and decision making power remaining with the caseworker. Other decision 
making approaches are to use decision making panels. Here a range of expertise or backgrounds 
can be combined so that the decision makers are able to draw on a range of internal resources in 
reaching their decisions. Panels are used by the Australian Financial Ombudsman Service and 
PhonepayPlus and may provide a good example of the way in which formal decision making can be 
structured to provide confidence in decision making. In the Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
approach, panels have a mix of industry and consumer representatives allowing each party to see 
very visibly that their interests are represented. The benefits of such approaches over the use of 
single case workers whose background, experience and qualifications may be unknown appear to be 
significant, albeit panel based systems will tend to be more costly. Interestingly, in the PhonepayPlus 
system,the tribunal is used to deal with non-compliant behaviour but equally used as a deterrent and 
encouragement for parties to take steps to ensure compliance and co-operation with PhonepayPlus. 
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We have already noted that the Ontario Ombudsman’s systemic role seeks to generate maximum 
influence over stakeholders and generate changes in behaviour. Other case studies provided 
insights in this area, using more traditional methods to achieve their goals. The Irish Financial 
Services Ombudsman talked about trying to assist businesses with the process of “internalising the 
methodology” and ensuring that the ombudsman’s approach is followed by businesses. An important 
a tool in this regard is the ability to publish case information about businesses, so that an incentive 
exists (in terms of negative publicity and, ultimately, possible impact on profits) to resolve cases and 
handle complaints well without the ombudsman’s intervention. The ability to publish such case 
information and make maximum use of case outcomes certainly seems to be an important tool in an 
ombudsman’s armoury for changing behaviours (in addition to others considered above such as 
moral suasion and using a sliding scale of fees). In some contexts, such as voluntary jurisdictions, 
however, the ability to publish case information may not be available. Here, attempts to influence 
behaviour must be aligned to exploiting businesses’ self-interest and providing services (such as 
advice and training) which businesses are likely to see as helping them to deliver their goals. The 
pressure to ensure reduced costs in voluntary environments means that there are likely to be limits 
to the extent to which ‘added value’ activities can be carried out. However, the nature of voluntary 
business participation in schemes may be of benefit in building cooperative relationships with 
businesses and using soft power to influence behaviours. 
 
Online Dispute Resolution 
 
It was noteworthy that the schemes we spoke to in this research were not generally using online 
dispute resolution methods. The Furniture Ombudsman did show us its case management system, 
which could be accessed online by businesses and this provides an example of a developing ODR 
platform. There would appear to be significant potential for developments in this area for 
ombudsman schemes; indeed, we note that some schemes in the UK, such as Ombudsman 
Services, are now using ODR platforms to aid their dispute resolution. Looking outside the 
ombudsman world, the case of eBay provides an insight into how dispute resolution is organised in a 
very different context. Here disputes between buyers and sellers are resolved by a semi-automated 
system which is able to resolve the vast majority of cases by providing options for settlement and 
encouraging parties to reach a view for themselves. One of the benefits of ODR platforms may be 
their accessibility and transparency, as well as being able to provide trusted information which 
enables parties to resolve cases themselves. A fascinating area of future development involves 
“crowdsourcing” decisions, where a panel of experienced buyers and sellers determine the outcome 
of a case. Particularly in areas where ombudsman schemes are taking contestable decisions about 
the requirements of fairness, the assistance of crowdsourced advice (if not decisions) may be 
helpful. If such crowdsourcing approaches become accepted and widely used in other contexts, they 
may have some potential for future incorporation into the work of ADR bodies. 
 
Design choices suggested by the case studies 
 
The nature of case study research is that it does not provide the comprehensive overview that might 
be obtained through other types of research; rather it provides detailed examples that offer insights 
into particular facets of a topic and offers suggestive possibilities for future research. While this is so, 
the case studies do indicate a range of design choices for ADR that can be identified and which may 
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be adapted for general use. The table below suggests some of the design choices that are indicated 
by the case studies. 
 
Table 9: Design choices suggested by the case studies 
 
Dispute resolution stage Suggested design choices 
 
Early stages Outcome agreed by the parties or imposed by case worker? 
 
Strict process or creativity and flexibility? 
 
Mediation High volume or low volume? 
 
Face to face or telephone? 
 
Later stages Single decision maker or panel? 
 
Inquisitorial or adversarial? 
 
Redress or prevention? 
 
Sanction or cooperation? 
 
General issues Single stage or multiple stage? 
 
Online or traditional dispute resolution? 
 
 
As will be evident the design choices that suggest themselves will not generally be binary and 
instead may involve a mix of approaches. Indeed rather than seeing the issue of design choice in 
such terms it may be more helpful to conceptualise ADR design as being a series of choices made 
along spectra, with each choice involving a particular view being taken about how a dispute 
resolution system should look. 
 
Model to assist ADR design 
 
To expand on the insights provided by the case studies and to assist with the process of designing 
and reviewing ADR mechanisms, we have created the model in figure 8, which shows key design 
choices, each along a spectrum. The model shows ten important spectra along which an ADR 
scheme may wish to position itself depending on the particular context in which it operates. The first 
four spectra involve 1st order issues and fundamental questions about how schemes should be set 
up. The last six spectra are 2nd order issues and relate to the design of the scheme’s ADR process. 
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Figure 8: 10 spectra of ADR design 
 
The rest of this section explains the model in figure 8 and describes in more detail the kind of design 
choices that must made in creating or amending an ADR scheme. 
 
Design choice 1: the funding mechanism 
 
The key question here is whether funding for an ADR scheme will be met from the public purse or will 
be imposed on the industry. Public sector schemes are generally funded publicly, while private sector 
schemes tend to be paid for by the industries they oversee. Other more detailed choices require to 
be made about funding, such as whether to fund a scheme through general membership fees, 
levies, case fees or a combination of these. Important choices also need to be made with regard to 
whether the funding model is aligned to broader goals of the ADR scheme e.g. whether attempts will 
be made to use fees to incentivise dispute resolution at an early stage.  
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Design choice 2: the scheme’s jurisdiction 
 
Designers will need to be clear about the nature of the jurisdiction and whether it is compulsory or 
voluntary. Schemes with compulsory jurisdictions will have a significantly different relationship with 
the bodies they oversee compared to schemes with voluntary jurisdictions. In some instances there 
may be a statutory requirement for businesses to be part of an ADR scheme but no single statutory 
body set up to fulfil this function, which will lead to choice of ADR schemes and competition between 
them. Where competition is a factor, designing a scheme to be attractive to potential members while 
fulfilling the fundamental goals of independent redress may be particularly challenging. Some 
schemes, such as the Legal Ombudsman, may combine statutory and voluntary jurisdictions, in 
which case separate dispute resolution processes may need to be developed to accommodate each 
area. 
 
Design choice 3: the scheme’s goals 
 
An important design goal relates to whether the scheme wishes to emphasise a redress focused 
model of dispute resolution or one that is focused on prevention. In the former case, the emphasis 
will be very much on the individual dispute under consideration and the core, traditional business of 
ADR. In the latter case, the scheme will take an interest in trying to prevent rather than only cure 
problems and will develop and deliver a range of additional services, functions and approaches. 
These functions are shown in figure 8 (on page 25) in the preventative dispute resolution model and 
include enhanced consumer-facing functions of advice and guidance, as well as enhanced business-
facing functions concerned with generating behaviour change. 
 
Design choice 4: the scheme’s emphasis 
 
Linked to design choice 3 is the issue of whose interests the scheme predominantly exists to serve 
and the extent to which the public interest is engaged in the work of the ADR body. For example, in 
areas of high potential consumer detriment a broad public interest is likely to exist in the operation 
of an effective ADR mechanism. There is also likely to be strong pressure in such areas for the ADR 
mechanism to undertake standard-raising work. In areas where the potential for consumer detriment 
is lower, dispute resolution may be considered to require a greater focus on meeting the needs of 
the private parties involved rather than any broader public interest. More generally, questions in this 
area may influence the extent to which schemes publish data on complaints. 
 
Design choice 5: the scheme’s structure 
 
The number and type of discrete stages that should form a scheme’s overall structure presents a 
number of challenges.  Questions here include not only whether the process should be tiered to 
involve several stages of appeal or review, but also whether each tier should be using a different 
dispute resolution technique. It may be, for example, that the early stages of a process use 
mediation or conciliation, with later stages becoming more evaluative and directive until a formal 
decision is imposed. Alternatively, the process may simply involve the provision of a decision which 
then may or may not be subject to further internal review. Some of the important issues here relate 
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to procedural fairness and the robustness of decision making procedures; the higher the value of the 
cases, the more formality is likely to be required in later stages. Cost in general is likely to be an 
issue and the provision of several stages is only likely to be of benefit where the earlier stages are 
successful in dealing with a reasonable proportion of cases. An important issue here is also who 
controls the process if several stages exist; if the parties have a right to decide, this may increase 
costs as cases that – objectively – do not merit escalation, end up at the formal stages of the 
process. 
 
Design choice 6: the scheme’s process 
 
A key choice here relates to the role of the case worker and whether they should be more similar to 
an investigator or to a judge. In the first case, providing a burden on the case worker to establish the 
facts through an inquisitorial process may have benefits of informality and speed, as the investigator 
is able to establish what evidence is required and make focused enquiries of the parties. This may 
be quicker and more efficient than relying on the parties to provide accounts of the case and their 
supporting evidence. One drawback of an inquisitorial approach may be that it reduces the 
participation of parties and may be less transparent than an adversarial process in which parties 
have had a full chance to make their case. Depending on the nature of the scheme, a more 
adversarial approach may result in quicker and cheaper dispute resolution; if the adjudicator is 
merely presented with each side’s account and supporting evidence and asked to adjudicate based 
on those facts, quick decisions may be possible. On the other hand, the benefits of a more 
inquisitorial approach are that it helps redress the balance between consumers and businesses, and 
can help to ensure that the former are not disadvantaged by a lack of experience in how to put their 
case. One way to ensure the balance of arms is redressed within an adversarial system might be to 
impose the burden of proof on businesses. This model is used by the Advertising Standards Authority 
in relation to misleading advertising: advertisers must be able to demonstrate that the claims they 
have made are true and to provide evidence to the ASA to substantiate any claims. While unlikely to 
be popular with businesses, such a system could certainly redress the power of arms and reduce the 
costs imposed on the ADR mechanism since the process would simply involve determining whether 
or not a business has managed to prove its case. 
 
Design choice 7: the scheme’s decision makers 
 
Many schemes involve single decision makers responsible for taking decisions, albeit they will often 
carry out their work in an organisational context which means that several individuals may be 
involved in a decision. For example, a case worker’s decision may have to be signed off by a 
manager or, less formally, may be subject to discussion amongst peers on the office floor. 
Nonetheless, models in which decisions are made by a single individual may suffer in terms of 
perceived fairness compared to models in which decisions are seen to be made by panels including 
a broad range of interests. Using single decision makers is likely to have advantages in time and cost 
compared to panels and a choice is therefore required with regard to whether the potential benefits 
of panels would outweigh the costs. Panel systems may be particularly helpful in industries which are 
new to ADR and require participation and assurances regarding the fairness, balance and expertise 
of the decisions to which they will be subjected. In the absence of clear qualifications or training 
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requirements for ADR case workers, using panels for some decisions may be an effective way of 
providing public assurances with regard to the decision making process. 
 
Design choice 8: the scheme’s use of technology 
 
The issue here largely relates to whether schemes will make extensive use of online dispute 
resolution or remain focused on more traditional dispute resolution channels. There is significant 
potential for ombudsman schemes to make greater use of technology and, at the very least, adopt 
the kind of ODR platform that allows consumers and businesses to upload information, track the 
progress of their case and obtain general information which is likely to have benefits for all schemes. 
Potentially such platforms can significantly cut down on the burden of case administration and may 
also be used to assist in the settlement of dispute themselves. For instance, if information about 
particular types of disputes and examples of relevant previous cases are provided in a targeted way 
to consumers and businesses, this may allow parties to clearly evaluate the strength of their case 
and may encourage settlement. An online system may also have some potential in terms of assisting 
caseworkers in determining whether cases are likely to be suitable for some kind of negotiated 
outcome (e.g. an automated form could ask both parties about their willingness to settle and the 
kind of options that might work, before suggesting to a case worker whether the case might be 
suitable). Online portals also have the potential to make use of intelligent technology to ensure that 
case workers have access to useful information when taking decisions (e.g. a system might 
recognise key words in a complaint and automatically suggest guidance notes, legislation and 
previous cases to assist the decision maker).  
 
Design choice 9: the preferred type of settlement 
 
This issue is core to the type of ADR mechanism that a scheme wishes to be: does it wish to foster 
agreements between parties, repair relationships and use predominantly facilitative techniques? Or 
is it more concerned with evaluating the merits of cases and providing objective decisions? Schemes 
may of course decide to use elements of both and to combine techniques, and choices here are 
likely to be determined again by the nature of the industries involved and the types of complaint 
being dealt with. Where there are ongoing relationships, in particular, there may be significant 
advantages in attempting a more consensual approach to dispute resolution. Such consensual 
approaches, when they work, may also bring broader benefits to the parties in terms of engagement 
and satisfaction. From the evidence of the case studies considered in this research, genuinely 
consensual approaches (e.g. conciliation, mediation) are used very little. There is significant scope to 
experiment in this area, for example by seeing if telephone conferences work in different contexts, or 
if one hour telephone mediations can be adapted. While this is the case, schemes must also 
consider carefully whether bringing other types of ADR into an ombudsman scheme risks extending 
the process and ultimately being more costly. 
 
Design choice 10: the outcome of decisions 
 
Questions here are about whether the decisions of the scheme will bind either or both parties. There 
has been significant debate in the past over whether ombudsman schemes in the public sector 
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require binding powers and the consensus has been that they are unnecessary in that context. 
Compliance rates tend to be very high and remedies recommended are implemented in most cases, 
with schemes relying on the quality of their reasoning, their moral authority and bad publicity to 
ensure compliance. Conversely, in the private sector there is recognition that binding powers are 
required. One choice is about whether decisions should bind both parties or only the business.  
Decisions also need to be taken about any appeal rights arising from decisions where they are 
binding. Where decisions are binding on both parties there are often appeal rights to courts (as in 
examples of the Irish Financial Services Ombudsman and the UK Pensions Ombudsman). 
 
Conclusion: a design toolkit 
 
The model for design choice described above offers some suggestions and guidance about key 
issues that need to be considered when deciding how a scheme might be designed. In terms of 
where any scheme should sit along these 10 spectra we suggest that there is no ‘ideal’ and that the 
particular context into which an ADR scheme is to fit will be crucially important in informing such 
choices. At the same time, we return to the notion discussed earlier around the harmonisation of 
ADR processes (Shand Smith and Vivian 2014) and note that broader consumer confidence requires 
an element of consistency between different bodies to ensure that the system (and its legitimacy) is 
understood and to have some assurance of its fairness. While it is beyond the scope of this report to 
suggest an ideal type of process around which ADR schemes might converge, the model we have 
suggested provides a starting point for discussing this issue. Finally, we have developed an ADR 
design toolkit (included in Annex 4) which the Legal Ombudsman (and other ADR schemes) may find 
helpful in the design and review of their processes. The toolkit aims to provide a practical tool for 
implementing the learning in this report. 
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Annex 1:  research methodology 
Research aims 
The overall aim this project was to 
 to identify interesting practices and approaches to dispute resolution used by other ADR 
providers, which LeO can learn from in developing its future dispute resolution process. 
Within this overall aim, we identified two distinct sets of ADR providers: 
 ADR schemes operating outwith the context of ombudsman and complaint handling 
schemes (e.g. adjudication schemes, mediation services, conciliation providers); and 
 Ombudsman schemes in which elements of ADR have been successfully incorporated (e.g. 
mediation used as a distinct stage within an ombudsman scheme’s dispute resolution 
process). 
 
Research questions 
In consultation with the Legal Ombudsman, the following research questions were devised. 
Description and evaluation of ADR processes used by the ADR provider 
1) What kind of ADR/innovative processes are being used by the ADR provider? 
2) Where a choice of process exists, how does the ADR provider triage cases to ensure that cases 
are dealt with through the most appropriate resolution process?  Are disputants offered a choice 
of process or is it imposed? 
3) How successful are the ADR processes used by the ADR provider in relation to: 
a) Cost? 
b) Flexibility and responsiveness to changing needs? 
c) Speed? 
d) Consistency? 
e) Confidentiality? 
f) Ability to influence outcome/ disputant control? 
g) Disputant satisfaction/ experience/ accessibility? 
h) Enforcement? 
4) What does the ADR provider consider to be the strengths and weaknesses of their ADR 
processes? 
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5) What plans does the ADR provider have to change their ADR processes?  Do they need consent 
from regulators or service providers?  Are their customers’ expectations changing and will this 
require new processes in future?  What might they look like? What does the ADR provider do to 
keep track of, and respond to, changing needs? 
6) How does the ADR provider ensure that good practice arising from its ADR work is captured?  
7) Does the ADR provider deal with hybrid complaints (that cross service sectors, where the bodies 
under jurisdiction operate in several sectors, or where there is overlap between service and 
conduct issues) and have their processes had to change to deal with those?  How does the ADR 
provider maintain its coherence in these circumstances? 
8) How are their services funded? Does the funding structure include a cost/charge/fee 
deferential? 
Broader issues 
9) How does the ADR provider build their public profile? 
10) How does the ADR provider increase their organisational impact?  
11) How do they contribute to broader system improvement? 
12) How is this measured? 
13) How does the ADR provider encourage service provider to join the dispute resolution scheme? 
14) How is the expertise of the ADR provider assessed/measured/regulated? 
Methodology 
Research design 
The research used a case study design.  This involved the selection of 10 case studies and the 
provision of in-depth, rounded descriptions of their approaches, processes and practices.  Case 
study research aims to collect information from as broad a range of data sources as possible in 
order to provide a holistic picture of the case under consideration.  Our methodology, therefore, 
included: 
 a review of academic literature;  
 desk research and documentary analysis; and  
 interviews and observation. 
Literature review 
We conducted a review of the academic literature on: 
 Types of ADR process; 
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 The advantages and disadvantages of various forms of ADR;  
 Criteria for choosing different approaches and redress design; and 
 The development of online dispute resolution and its use in a range of contexts. 
The review helped us to design our research instruments (e.g. interview schedules, observation 
sheets) and provided a grounding for the research in relation to current knowledge of the subject. 
Desk research and documentary analysis 
The desk research involved the collection of publicly available information in relation to ADR 
providers that have been identified as suitable case studies.  This included a range of sources such 
as: the ADR provider’s website, annual reports, guidance documents, etc. 
In some cases, we also asked case studies to provide relevant internal, unpublished documentation 
that may assist in building a full picture of the ADR processes being used. This included: internal 
guidelines/procedures/help notes, organisational structure documents, unpublished performance 
data and statistics, etc.   
Interviews and observation 
An interview schedule was prepared based on the research questions listed above.  We requested 
interviews with two members of staff: a strategic manager/organisational leader and an operational 
manager.  This was to ensure that relevant data can be collected both in relation to the detail of the 
ADR processes being used and how they work in practice, and in relation to the broader strategic 
environment and future practice. In practice, the research methods used with each case study varied 
significantly due to practical factors (the table over the page provides a summary of the fieldwork 
conducted with each case study).  Interviews were tape recorded and professionally transcribed.  
They occurred either face to face, by telephone or by email. 
Where relevant and practical (i.e. where further information was required, where providers were 
based in the UK and where confidentiality measures allowed), we conducted observations of the ADR 
processes used by the provider.   
Case selection and sampling 
We selected ten studies for detailed consideration as part of the research.  The sampling strategy 
was ‘purposive’; this means that cases were selected not because they were representative of a 
broader population but because they had features that relate directly to the project’s research aims 
and questions.  The criteria for selecting case studies to take part included: 
 Whether it appears, on the face of it, that the ADR provider is using interesting practices; 
 The relevance of the ADR provider’s work and practices to LeO; 
 The ADR provider’s willingness to take part in the research; and 
 LeO’s ideas about cases that would be most useful to learn from. 
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Table: Fieldwork summary 
Case Study Fieldwork Summary 
Australia Financial Ombudsman Service  1 x 80 minute Skype group interview with 1 senior  
manager and  2 operational managers 
 
Furniture Ombudsman 1 X introductory presentation 
2 x 45 minute to 1 hour face-to-face interviews with 
senior manager and caseworker 
Observation of case management system and 
informal conversations with staff 
 
Irish Financial Services Ombudsman 1 x introductory presentation 
5 x 30 minutes to 1 hour face to face interviews with 
senior managers and adjudicative staff 
 
New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 1 x 2 hour group Skype interview with senior 
managers and adjudicative staff. 
 
New Zealand Law Society’s Lawyers Complaint 
Service’s Early Resolution Service 
Email interview with questions for Strategic Manager 
and Operational Manager 
 
Ontario Ombudsman 2 x 1 hour telephone interviews with senior managers 
 
PhonepayPlus 3 x 1 hour face to face interviews with senior 
manager, manager and legal officer 
Observation of case management and informal 
conversations with 3 additional members of staff in 
different roles 
 
Small Claims Mediation Service 1 x 1 hour telephone interview with manager 
1 x 1 hour face to face interview with mediator 
Observation of two telephone mediations 
 
UK European Consumer Centre  1 x 100 minute face to face interview with Senior 
manager and operational manager  
Observations of case handling management system, 
listening to telephone calls with consumers and 
informal conversations with one complaint handler 
 
eBay 1 x 3 hour face to face interview with an industry 
expert 
1 x 1 hour face to face interview with an industry 
expert 
1 x 30 minute telephone interview with an industry 
expert 
1 x 30 minute skype interview with an industry expert 
in India 
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Annex 2: the Legal Ombudsman’s current model 
1. Maturity and jurisdiction checks 
 Check that complaint has been made to legal service provider and that 8 weeks has been 
given to allow them to resolve the problem. 
 
 Check that the complaint is eligible to be dealt with under the Legal Ombudsman’s Scheme 
Rules. 
2. Informal resolution and investigation 
 After a complaint is accepted, it is allocated to an Investigator within 10 days. If it takes any 
longer than that, the consumer is informed. 
 
 Once allocated, the Investigator contacts the consumer within five working days to discuss 
the complaint in more detail. 
 
 The Investigator then gets in touch with the lawyer to get information and any evidence that 
might be needed. 
 
 The Investigator will try to resolve the matter informally with both parties and to try to reach 
an amicable settlement. 
 
 If that isn't possible, the Investigator will write a Recommendation Report. This covers the 
investigation, the views of both parties, and may also propose a remedy or action the lawyer 
should take. 
 
 If the consumer and the lawyer agree with the recommendation made, the case will be 
closed as an informal resolution. 
3. Ombudsman decision 
 If the consumer or the lawyer disagrees with the Recommendation Report, they need to give 
reasons why within 10 working days. 
 
 The comments given are summarised and sent, with the Recommendation Report, to an 
Ombudsman. 
 
 The Ombudsman will read the report and any comments before making a decision. If the 
consumer accepts the decision, the lawyer must do what the Ombudsman has decided (if 
anything), or could face legal action. 
 
 If the consumer accepts the decision and it's in their favour, they won't be able to take any 
further legal action about their complaint. 
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 If the consumer doesn’t accept the decision that has been made, we will close the case. We 
aim to deal with all complaints we accept within 90 days. 
4. Improvement and impact activities 
 Publication of statistical data about legal service providers 
 
 Publication of case summaries 
 
 Publication of ombudsman decisions 
 
 Commissioning research 
 
 Guidance on good complaint handling 
 
 Guidance on specific topics (e.g. costs) 
 
 CPD courses on good complaint handling 
(Source: based on Legal Ombudsman website) 
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Annex 3: case studies factual background 
Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
Country:  Australia 
Jurisdiction:  Financial service providers 
Case Volume: 24,100 disputes were accepted as disputes in 2012/ 2013  
Staffing:   305 FTE Staff 
Funding:  Funded by levy on financial service providers and case fees 
Status: Membership scheme, participation voluntary (although all industry bodies 
must belong to a scheme) 
Processes: Conciliation, Negotiation, Adjudication by single ombudsman and panel 
decisions 
Furniture Ombudsman 
Country:  UK 
Jurisdiction:  Members of the furniture industry who opt in to scheme 
Complaint Volume: 1,817 complaints/ year in 2012-2013 
Staffing:  9 staff 
Funding:  Funded by membership fees 
Status:   Voluntary, membership scheme 
Processes:  Conciliation, Adjudication 
Irish Financial Services Ombudsman  
Country:  Ireland 
Jurisdiction:  Financial services providers 
Complaint Volume: 8125 complaints/year in 2012 
Staffing:  34 
Funding:  Funded by levy on financial service providers  
Status:   Statutory scheme with compulsory jurisdiction 
Processes:  Mediation, Adjudication 
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New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 
Country:  New Zealand 
Jurisdiction:  Members of the banking industry 
Complaint Volume: 2,592 complaints/year in 2012-2013 
Staffing:  16 staff 
Funding:  Funded by levy on members and case fees 
Status: Membership scheme, participation voluntary (although all industry bodies 
must belong to a scheme) 
Processes:  Facilitation, Conciliation, Adjudication 
New Zealand Law Society’s Lawyers Complaint Service’s Early Resolution Service 
Country:  New Zealand 
Jurisdiction:  Lawyers 
Complaint Volume: 1,742 complaints in the year ending 31 January 2014 
Staffing:  Three part time resolvers and two administrative staff in the ERS 
Funding: Funded through the Law Society: lawyers pay annual practising certificate fees 
and levies 
Status: The Law Society regulates all lawyers, but membership of the Society is 
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to the complaints process. 
Processes:  Early Resolution, Investigation, Adjudication 
Ontario Ombudsman 
Country:  Canada 
Jurisdiction:  Regional government 
Complaint Volume: 26,999 complaints /year in 2013-14 
Staffing:  88 staff 
Funding:  Publicly funded 
Status:   Statutory ombudsman, compulsory 
Processes:  Early Resolution, Investigation, Systemic Investigation 
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PhonepayPlus 
Country:  UK 
Jurisdiction: Regulates premium rate or phone paid services in the UK and secures 
redress for consumers 
Case Volume: 15,836 complaints in 2013 /14, 8,250 of these complaints proceeded to 
some form of enforcement action.   
Staffing:  47 Staff 
Funding: Industry levy plus any fines imposed are used to subsidise the costs of the 
service  
Status: Compulsory  
Processes: Conciliation and Adjudication by Panel Decision 
Small Claims Mediation Service 
Country:  England 
Jurisdiction:  Small claims disputes 
Case Volume:  Approximately 14,400 booking requests a year 
Staffing:  34 staff 
Funding:  Publicly funded 
Status:   Voluntary dispute scheme for small  claims 
Processes:  Telephone mediation 
UK European Consumer Centre 
Country:  UK 
Jurisdiction: Cross border disputes between consumers and traders (non-financial 
disputes) 
Case Volume: 4394 complaints in 2013  
Staffing:  6.5 Staff 
Funding:  Publicly funded  
Status: Any trader who engages with the UK-ECC does so voluntarily 
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Processes: Conciliation and Advocacy.  Attempts to resolve complaints via persuasion.   
eBay 
Country:                        USA  
Jurisdiction:                        All buyers and sellers using eBay 
Case Volume:                     60 million disputes each year  
Staffing:                              Data not available 
Funding:                             Funded by eBay 
Status:                                Voluntary business scheme 
Processes:                          ODR, Assisted Negotiation, Adjudication  
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Annex 4: ADR design toolkit 
Step 1: Funding  
Design choices Questions  Case study examples and options 
Public sector schemes are generally funded 
publicly out of general taxation, while private 
sector schemes tend to be paid for by the 
industries they oversee. Other more detailed 
choices require to be made about funding, 
such as whether to fund a scheme through 
general membership fees, levies, case fees 
or a combination of these. Important choices 
also need to be made with regard to whether 
the funding model is aligned to broader 
goals of the ADR scheme i.e. whether 
attempts will be made to use fees to 
incentivise dispute resolution at an early 
stage or to require those whose actions 
cause the most complaints to pay more. 
 
 
 Is there a justification for public funding 
of the scheme (e.g. where government 
activity is overseen)? 
 Should funding come from general levies 
on a sector (or the scheme’s 
membership) or case fees or both? 
 If a scheme uses both levies and case 
fees, what proportion of funding should 
come from each stream? 
 To what extent will the funding 
mechanism be used in support of 
broader dispute resolution goals? 
 Will case fees be differentiated 
depending on the stage at which a 
dispute is settled within the ADR 
process? 
 Furniture Ombudsman (Annual 
membership fee, fee based on turnover 
+ case fee) 
 Ontario Ombudsman (Government 
funded from general taxation) 
 New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 
(Membership fee based on turnover, 
case fees which increase at each stage 
of escalation) 
 PhonepayPlus (funded by a levy on the 
industry. Fines imposed are carried 
forward to the next financial year and are 
used to reduce the levy).  
 UK – European Consumer Centre 
(government and EU funded) 
Step 2: Jurisdiction  
Design choices Questions for designers Case study examples and options 
Designers need to be clear about the nature 
of the jurisdiction and whether it is 
compulsory or voluntary. Schemes with 
compulsory jurisdictions will have a 
significantly different relationship with the 
bodies they oversee compared to schemes 
with voluntary jurisdictions and their 
members. In some instances there may be a 
statutory requirement for businesses to be 
part of an ADR scheme but no single 
statutory body set up to fulfil this function. 
This may lead to choice of ADR schemes 
and competition between schemes. Where 
 Is there significant potential for 
consumer detriment in a particular 
sector, indicating a need for compulsory 
ADR? 
 How effective and accessible are existing 
methods of dispute resolution in a given 
sector or industry? 
 Is self-regulation and voluntary 
membership likely to be sufficient to 
address any potential for consumer 
detriment? 
 If a statutory requirement is imposed on 
businesses in a sector to become 
 Irish Financial Ombudsman Bureau 
(compulsory, high potential for detriment 
in financial services) 
 New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 
(compulsory but with no single statutory 
ADR body) 
 Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
(compulsory but with no single statutory 
body) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (voluntary) 
 New Zealand Legal Complaints Service 
(compulsory) 
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competition is a factor, designing a scheme 
to be attractive to potential members while 
fulfilling the fundamental goals of 
independent redress may be particularly 
challenging. Some schemes such as the 
Legal Ombudsman, may combine statutory 
and voluntary jurisdictions in which case 
separate dispute resolution processes may 
need to be developed to accommodate each 
area. 
members of a scheme, how will schemes 
be approved and regulated? 
 Where there is competition between 
schemes in a sector, how will quality and 
standards remain consistent between 
schemes? 
 Is there potential for voluntary and 
compulsory jurisdictions to be combined 
by the same ADR body and, if so, what 
are the risks associated with this? 
Step 3: Goals  
Design choices Questions for designers Case study examples and options 
An important design goal relates to whether 
the scheme wishes to emphasise a redress 
focused model of dispute resolution or one 
that is focused on prevention. In the former 
case, the emphasis will be very much on the 
individual dispute under consideration and 
the core, traditional business of ADR. In the 
latter case, the scheme will take an interest 
in trying to prevent rather than only cure 
problems and will develop a range of 
additional services, functions and 
approaches in order to deliver this. These 
functions include enhanced consumer 
facing functions of advice and guidance as 
well as enhanced business facing functions 
concerned with generating behaviour 
change. 
 
 Is the goal of the scheme to act as a 
straightforward alternative to court 
processes? 
 Is the scheme operating in a sector 
which is regulated and where a regulator 
might be expected to undertake 
systemic improvement activities? 
 Does the scheme operate in an area 
where there is existing consumer advice 
and education provided? 
 Does the political, cultural or business 
environment the scheme operates in 
allow for the pursuit of preventative 
approaches? 
 How will the cost of pursuing 
preventative approaches be met and 
what measures need to be taken to 
justify that cost? 
 Can some preventative approaches 
(such as training and providing 
feedback/ consultancy/ advice) 
generate an income stream for the ADR 
body? 
 
 Ontario Ombudsman (combines redress 
and prevention, but strong emphasis on 
catalysing systemic change) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (emphasis on 
redress, with preventative work needing 
to be channelled through cooperative 
activities that directly benefit business) 
 Irish Financial Ombudsman Bureau 
(publishing case data as part of a 
preventative approach) 
 UK-ECC (mostly focused on redress but 
also a role in educating business and 
consumers on consumer rights) 
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Step 4: Emphasis  
Design choices Questions for designers Case study examples and options 
Linked to step 3 above is the issue of whose 
interests the scheme predominantly exists to 
serve and the extent to which the public 
interest is addressed by the ADR body. For 
example, in areas of high potential 
consumer detriment a broad public interest 
is likely to exist in the operation of an 
effective ADR mechanism. There is also 
likely to be strong pressure in such areas for 
the ADR mechanism to fulfil standard raising 
in order to help safeguard the broader public 
interest. In areas where the potential for 
consumer detriment is lower, dispute 
resolution may be considered to require a 
greater focus on meeting the needs of the 
private parties involved rather than any 
broader public interest. 
. 
 
 What levels of consumer detriment exist 
in the particular sector or industry in 
which a scheme operate? 
 Do a range of social actors have an 
interest in the operation of an ADR 
scheme in a particular area? 
 Where public interest in the efficient 
operation of a scheme is high, how will 
the scheme ensure it operates 
transparently (e.g. through the public 
reporting of casework and performance 
data)? 
 Where dispute resolution is considered 
to be a largely private matter between 
parties, how can a scheme be adapted 
to meet their particular needs? 
 Where public interest is lower, how can a 
scheme ensure that it is not dominated 
by the interests of industry at the 
expense of consumers? 
 Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
(as with other financial ADR bodies, high 
potential for detriment and strong public 
interest present) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (although 
operating in an area where detriment 
exists, operates a self-regulatory, 
voluntary mode which emphasise the 
pursuit of private interests) 
 PhonepayPlus (individual harm can be 
low however potential for harm to the 
collective consumer interest is high) 
Step 5: Structure  
Design choices Questions for designers Case study examples and options 
The number and type of discrete stages that 
should form a scheme’s overall structure 
present a number of challenges. Questions 
here include not only whether the process 
should be tiered to involve several stages of 
appeal or review, but also whether each tier 
should be using a different dispute 
resolution technique. It may be, for example, 
that the early stages of a process use 
mediation or conciliation, with later stages 
becoming more evaluative and directive until 
a formal decision is imposed. Alternatively, 
the process may simply involve the provision 
 What is the value of the disputes being 
considered by the scheme and, if high 
value, does this indicate a need for 
formal appeal stages within a scheme’s 
process? 
 Is participation in a scheme voluntary or 
in an environment where schemes 
compete and, if so, does this indicate 
the use of single stage, cheaper 
processes? 
 If several stages are used, are they used 
as a procedural safeguard/ right of 
 Furniture Ombudsman (multi-process 
structure, where access to processes is 
controlled by the ADR body rather than 
the parties) 
 New Zealand Law Society Early 
Resolution Service (multi-process 
structure, where access to the process is 
controlled by an oversight committee) 
 Irish Financial Ombudsman Service 
Bureau (multi-process structure, with 
mediation provided as an option for all 
disputes but with low take up) 
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of a decision which then may or may not be 
subject to further internal review. Some of 
the important issues here relate to 
procedural fairness and the robustness of 
decision making procedures; the higher the 
value of the cases the more formality is 
likely to be required in later stages. Cost in 
general is likely to be an issue and the 
provision of several stages is only likely to be 
of benefit where the earlier stages are 
successful in dealing with a reasonable 
proportion of cases. An important issue here 
is also who controls the process if several 
stages exist. 
appeal to be invoked by the parties, or 
are different procedures available at the 
discretion of the ADR body? 
 Are ongoing relationships between 
consumers and businesses a feature of 
the industry covered by the ADR body? If 
so, what potential is there to use more 
consensual methods? 
 
 Small Claims Mediation Service (single 
process structure, but with court as 
backstop) 
 Ontario Ombudsman (multi-process 
structure, with an ‘issue based’ 
approach controlled by the ADR body 
and a special procedure for systemic 
cases) 
Step 6: Process  
Design choices Questions for designers? Case study examples and options 
A key choice here relates to the role of the 
case worker and whether they should be 
more similar to an investigator or to a judge. 
In the first case, placing the burden on the 
case worker to establish the facts through 
an inquisitorial process may have benefits of 
informality and speed, as the investigator is 
able to establish what evidence is required 
and make focused enquiries of the parties. 
This may be quicker than relying on the 
parties to provide accounts of the case and 
their supporting evidence. The benefits of a 
more inquisitorial approach are that it helps 
redress the balance between consumers 
and businesses and can help to ensure that 
the former are not disadvantaged by a lack 
of experience in how to put their cases. One 
way to ensure any inequality of bargaining 
power is redressed within an adversarial 
system and to speed it up might be to 
impose the burden of proof on businesses.  
 Will the process be primarily inquisitorial 
or adversarial? 
 To what extent is there an imbalance of 
power between consumers and 
organisations in the area overseen by 
the ADR body? 
 To what extent is the participation of the 
parties in the process of dispute 
resolution perceived to be beneficial in 
the area overseen by the ADR body? 
 Will reversing the burden of proof be 
feasible/ acceptable to organisations 
being covered by the ADR body? 
 
 Irish Financial Services Ombudsman 
(primarily adversarial system, although 
the case worker will set out the issues 
that they consider require to be 
addressed) 
 Ontario Ombudsman (inquisitorial 
system, including processes for systemic 
investigation) 
 UK-European Consumer Centre (system 
involving limited fact finding and using 
more suasion to obtain outcomes) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (in some cases 
consumer law places the burden of proof 
on businesses dealt with by the 
Furniture Ombudsman) 
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Step 7: Decision Makers  
Design choices Questions for designers? Case study examples and options 
Many schemes involve single decision 
makers responsible for taking decisions, 
albeit they will often carry out their work in 
an organisational context which means that 
several individuals may be involved in a 
decision. For example, a case worker’s 
decision may have to be signed off by a 
manager or, less formally, may be subject to 
discussion amongst peers in the office.  For 
some areas the complaint may raise difficult 
questions of fact which require expert 
determination and a scheme’s access to 
independent experts may be an effective 
way to resolve the dispute. 
 Is acceptance of an ADR scheme by 
industry or by consumers likely to be 
particularly challenging? 
 Is industry likely to prefer a low cost 
model (which would argue for a single 
decision maker) or one which 
emphasises industry participation and 
control (panel)? 
 Will there be a role for panels in a small 
number of escalated cases? 
 Will the complaint involve difficult 
questions of fact which require expert 
determination? 
 Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
(use of panels for some cases) 
 PhonepayPlus (use of panel/ tribunal for 
some cases) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (single decision 
maker with no internal right of appeal, 
access to independent experts where 
required) 
 
Step 8: Technology  
Design choices Questions for designers Case study examples and options 
The issue here largely relates to whether 
schemes will make extensive use of online 
dispute resolution or remain focused on 
more traditional dispute resolution channels. 
There is significant potential for ombudsman 
schemes to make greater use of technology 
and, at the very least, adopting the kind of 
ODR platform that allows consumers and 
businesses to upload information, track the 
progress of their case and obtain general 
information is likely to have benefits for all 
schemes. Potentially such platforms can 
significantly cut down on the burden of case 
administration and may also be used to 
assist in the settlement of dispute 
themselves. For instance, if information 
about particular types of disputes and 
examples of relevant previous cases are 
provided in a targeted way to consumers 
 Will all or part of the service make use of 
an online dispute resolution platform? 
 Are there particular accessibility issues 
(in terms of access to the internet and IT 
literacy) which particularly effect the 
area in which the ADR body will operate? 
 What alternative measures may be 
required to ensure accessibility of the 
ADR body? 
 What volume of cases will the ADR body 
deal with and is investment in online 
dispute resolution platforms likely to be 
cost effective if volumes are low? 
 Are the disputes of a type, value and 
level of complexity such that assisted 
settlements using automated systems 
are likely? 
 Will the scheme make use of other 
technologies such as the telephone/ 
 Furniture Ombudsman (portal that can 
be accessed directly by businesses, and 
automated update system for 
consumers at key touch points) 
 Ebay/ PayPal (sophisticated system for 
dealing with high volume disputes, with a 
high percentage of cases resolved 
through automated assisted settlement) 
 Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
(telephone conciliation conferences) 
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and businesses this may allow them to 
clearly evaluate the strength of their case 
and may encourage settlement. An online 
system may also have some potential in 
terms of assisting caseworkers in 
determining whether cases are likely to be 
suitable for some kind of negotiated 
outcome. 
mobile/ Skype/ Adobe connect to bring 
parties together and to personalise the 
dispute resolution process? 
 Are simple improvements to the speed 
and accessibility of communications (e.g. 
template text messages) available? 
Step 9: Settlement  
Design choices Questions for designers? Case study examples and options 
This question is core to the type of ADR 
mechanism that a scheme wishes to be: 
does it wish to foster agreements between 
parties, repair relationships and use 
predominantly facilitative techniques? Or is 
it more concerned with evaluating the merits 
of cases and providing objective decisions? 
Schemes may of course decide to use 
elements of both and to combine 
techniques, and choices here are likely to be 
determined again by the nature of the 
industries involved and the types of 
complaint being dealt with. Where there are 
ongoing relationships, in particular, there 
may be significant advantages in attempting 
a more consensual approach to dispute 
resolution. Such consensual approaches, 
when they work, may also bring broader 
benefits to the parties in terms of 
engagement and satisfaction. From the 
evidence of the case studies considered in 
this research, genuinely consensual 
approaches (e.g. conciliation, mediation) 
were used relatively little.  
 
 
 
 How cooperative is the particular 
industry or sector covered by the ADR 
body? Does it have a significant ‘rogue’ 
element? 
 Are consumers in a specific sector 
particularly vulnerable and likely to settle 
for less than they are due if facilitative 
techniques are used? 
 Is the industry or sector likely to favour 
formal, predictable decision making? 
 Are there ongoing relationships which 
may be important to maintain? 
 If a multi-process structure is created, 
are there particular types of cases that 
might be suitable for facilitated 
outcomes? Would this involve either 
large volumes of low value claims or low 
volumes of high value claims, depending 
on the process used? 
 Unless the ADR body operates in a purely 
facilitative and consensual mode, is 
there a danger that overall costs will end 
being high if cases escalate through 
several processes? 
 Small Claims Mediation Service 
(operates mediation service as an 
alternative to formal court adjudication) 
 Financial Services Ombudsman in 
Ireland (low volume mediation service, 
generally for high value or complex 
cases) 
 Australian Financial Ombudsman Service 
(operates a telephone conciliation 
services as well as using other 
negotiated and adjudicative methods) 
 New Zealand Banking Ombudsman 
(combines facilitative methods with 
more formal adjudicative methods, in 
common with several of the other case 
studies) 
 European Consumer Centre (by virtue of 
not having adjudicative powers, relies on 
consensual approaches to persuade 
businesses to take account of consumer 
rights) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (use of experts in 
the formal stage of dispute resolution) 
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Step 10: Outcomes  
Design choices Questions for designers? Case study examples and options 
Questions here are about whether the 
decisions of the scheme will bind either or 
both parties. There has been significant 
debate in the past over whether 
ombudsman schemes in the public sector 
require binding powers and the consensus 
has been that they are unnecessary in that 
context. Compliance rates tend to be very 
high and remedies recommended are 
implemented in most cases with schemes 
relying on the quality of their reasoning, their 
moral authority and bad publicity to ensure 
compliance. In the private sector there is 
recognition that binding powers are 
required. One choice is about whether 
decisions should bind both parties or only 
the business.  Decisions also need to be 
taken about any appeal rights arising from 
decisions where they are binding. Where 
decisions are binding on both parties there 
are often appeal rights to courts (as in 
examples of the Irish Financial Services 
Ombudsman and the UK Pensions 
Ombudsman). 
 Are there particular concerns around 
compliance with decisions, such that 
decisions require to be legally binding 
and enforceable? 
 If decisions are binding, will the ADR 
body or the consumer be responsible for 
enforcement action where a body 
refuses to comply? 
 Might the benefits of binding decisions 
be outweighed by the relationship 
between the ADR body and industry 
becoming more confrontational and less 
cooperative? 
 If decisions are to be binding, will they 
bind the business only or both the 
business and the consumer? 
 Where ADR bodies bind both parties will 
there be a right of appeal to a judicial 
body (e.g. Irish Financial Ombudsman 
Bureau and Pensions Ombudsman)? 
 Irish Financial Services Ombudsman 
(decisions binding on both parties) 
 Furniture Ombudsman (decisions 
binding on the business) 
 Ontario Ombudsman (decision not 
binding on either parties) 
 Small Claims Mediation Service (decision 
agreed in the mediation agreement are 
binding on both parties) 
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